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Abstract
Epidemic processes are common out-of-equilibrium phenomena of broad interdisciplinary interest. In this thesis, we show how message-passing approach can be
a helpful tool for simulating epidemic models in disordered medium like networks,
and in particular for estimating the probability that a given node will become infectious at a particular time. The sort of dynamics we consider are stochastic, where
randomness can arise from the stochastic events or from the randomness of network
structures.
As in belief propagation, variables or messages in message-passing approach are
defined on the directed edges of a network. However, unlike belief propagation,
where the posterior distributions are updated according to Bayes’ rule, in messagepassing approach we write di↵erential equations for the messages over time. It takes
correlations between neighboring nodes into account while preventing causal signals
from backtracking to their immediate source, and thus avoids “echo chamber effects” where a pair of adjacent nodes each amplify the probability that the other is
infectious.

v

In our first results, we develop a message-passing approach to threshold models
of behavior popular in sociology. These are models, first proposed by Granovetter, where individuals have to hear about a trend or behavior from some number of
neighbors before adopting it themselves. In thermodynamic limit of large random
networks, we provide an exact analytic scheme while calculating the time dependence
of the probabilities and thus learning about the whole dynamics of bootstrap percolation, which is a simple model known in statistical physics for exhibiting discontinuous
phase transition.
As an application, we apply a similar model to financial networks, studying when
bankruptcies spread due to the sudden devaluation of shared assets in overlapping
portfolios. We predict that although diversification may be good for individual institutions, it can create dangerous systemic e↵ects, and as a result financial contagion
gets worse with too much diversification. We also predict that financial system
exhibits “robust yet fragile” behavior, with regions of the parameter space where
contagion is rare but catastrophic whenever it occurs.
In further results, we develop a message-passing approach to recurrent state epidemics like susceptible-infectious-susceptible and susceptible-infectious-recoveredsusceptible where nodes can return to previously inhabited states and multiple waves
of infection can pass through the population. Given that message-passing has been
applied exclusively to models with one-way state changes like susceptible-infectious
and susceptible-infectious-recovered, we develop message-passing for recurrent epidemics based on a new class of di↵erential equations and demonstrate that our approach is simple and efficiently approximates results obtained from Monte Carlo
simulation, and that the accuracy of message-passing is often superior to the pair
approximation (which also takes second-order correlations into account).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
But what does it mean, the plague?
- Albert Camus

In this manuscript, we study mathematical approaches for epidemics in networks.
Epidemics, also known as contact processes, are common non-equilibrium phenomena that have gained vigorous attention in recent years because of important interdisciplinary applications. Examples include contagion of diseases [1, 2] and social
behaviors [3, 4, 5, 6], cascades of forest fires [7, 8, 9] and banking failures [10, 11],
propagation of marginal probabilities in constraint satisfaction problems [12, 13], the
dynamics of magnetic and glassy systems [14], and so on.
Mathematical models of epidemics are intrinsically non-linear and multiplicative. The classical approach to modeling epidemics, such as the SIR (susceptibleinfectious-recovered) model where each node is Susceptible, Infectious, or Recovered,
assumes that at any given time each individual exists in a single state or “compartment” [1, 2]. To make these models analytically tractable, it is often assumed that
the population is well mixed, so that interaction between any two individuals is

1
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Figure 1.1: An example of a complete network with eleven individuals or nodes,
where every node is connected via an edge to every other node.

equally likely as if the epidemics are happening in a complete network as shown in
Fig. 1.1. In physical terms, we assume the model is mean-field (also known as massaction mixing). In spite of this simple but unrealistic assumption, mean-field models
capture some essential features of epidemics, such as a threshold above which we
have an endemic phase with a non-zero fraction of infected individuals, and below
which we have outbreaks of size o(n) so that the equilibrium fraction of infected
individuals is zero.
In reality, the mixing of individuals is often sparse and highly structured, with
some pairs of individuals much more likely to interact than others due to location
or demographics [15, 6]. We mean sparse in the sense that the number of neighbors
with which individuals interact is an intensive quantity, i.e. the number of neighbors
is independent of the size of the population. Analogous to low dimensional lattices
in statistical physics, correlations in sparse networks play an important role, making
problems in sparse networks elude solutions derived through a mean-field approximation that washes out spatial correlations. The specific realization of sparse networks
thus becomes essential to consider [16, 17, 18]. However, the network structure sub-

2
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stantially increases a model’s complexity.
One reasonable goal is to compute the one-point marginals, e.g., for each node
i, the probability Ii (t) that i is infectious at time t. In addition to being of direct
interest, these marginals help us perform tasks such as inferring the originator of an
epidemic, determining an optimal set of nodes to immunize in order to minimize the
final size of an outbreak, or calculating the probability that an entire group of nodes
will remain uninfected after a fixed time [19, 20, 21, 22, 23].
We can always compute these marginals by performing Monte Carlo experiments.
However, since we need to perform many independent trials in order to collect good
statistics, this is computationally expensive on large networks. This problem is
compounded if we need to scan through parameter space, or if we want to explore
many di↵erent initial conditions, vaccination strategies, etc. Therefore, it would be
desirable to compute these marginals using, say, a system of di↵erential equations,
with variables that directly model the probabilities of various events.
The most naive way to do this, as we review below, uses the one-point marginals
themselves as variables. However, this approach completely ignores correlations between nodes. At the other extreme, to model the system exactly, we would need
to keep track of the entire joint distribution: but if there are n individuals, each of
which can be in one of k states, the result is a coupled system with kn variables.
This exponential scaling quickly renders most models computationally intractable,
even on moderately sized networks.
In between these two extremes, we can approximate the joint distribution by
“moment closure,” assuming that higher-order marginals can be written in terms of
lower-order ones. This gives a hierarchy of increasingly accurate (and computationally expensive) approximations, familiar in physics as cluster expansions. At the first
level of this hierarchy we assume that the nodes are uncorrelated, and approximate

3

Chapter 1. Introduction
two-point marginals such as [Ii (t)Ij (t)] (the probability that i and j are both infectious at time t) as Ij (t)Ij (t). At the second level, commonly referred to as the pair
approximation, we close the hierarchy at the level of pairs [Ii (t)Ij (t)] by assuming
that three-point correlations can be factored in terms of two-point correlations. We
review these methods in Chapter 2.
In this thesis, we study an alternative method, namely Dynamic Message-Passing
(DMP). As in belief propagation [24, 25], here variables or “messages” are defined
on a network’s directed edges: for instance, Ij!i denotes the probability that j was
infected by one of its neighbors other than i, so that the epidemic might spread
from j to i. However, unlike belief propagation, where the posterior distributions
are updated according to Bayes’ rule, here we write di↵erential equations for the
messages over time.
We will see that the directional nature of the messages prevents causal signals
from backtracking to their immediate source, and thus avoids “echo chamber effects” where a pair of adjacent nodes each amplify the probability that the other
is infectious. DMP was first applied to disease propagation on networks by Karrer
and Newman (2010) [26], who investigated non-recurrent state epidemiological models such as the SI (susceptible-infectious), the SIR (susceptible- infectious-recovered)
and the SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered) models.
In this thesis, we make the following contributions:

• To prepare the reader, in Chapter 2, we provide background materials for three
substantive chapters that are to follow.

• In Chapter 3, in collaboration with my adviser Cristopher Moore, we extend
Karrer and Newman (2010) [26] by generalizing DMP to threshold models
where healthy individuals get infected only when a certain number of their

4
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neighbors pass infection, a process thought to be important for the propagation of memes and first proposed by Granovetter, where each individual has to
hear about a trend or behavior from some number of neighbors before adopting it themselves [27]. In thermodynamic limit of large random networks, we
provide an exact analytic scheme while calculating the time dependence of
the probabilities and thus learning about the whole dynamics of bootstrap
percolation. [Note that bootstrap percolation model is known and studied in
statistical physics for exhibiting discontinuous phase transition.] Our approach
is general enough to incorporate non-Markovian processes and to include heterogeneous thresholds, and thus can be applied to explore rich sets of complex
heterogeneous agent-based models.
The work described in this chapter was published in Phys. Rev. E 89, 022805
(2014). [27].

• In Chapter 4, in collaboration with Sam Scarpino and Cristopher Moore, we
extend DMP to a general class of epidemics models including “recurrent”
models such as SIS (susceptible-infectious-susceptible) and SIRS (susceptibleinfectious-recovered-susceptible), where multiple waves of infection can pass
through the population. To date, DMP has been exclusively applied to nonrecurrent models, where individuals cannot return to previously occupied state
[26, 28, 27, 29, 30]. We have developed a new class of di↵erential equations for
these models. Our methods are much faster than direct simulation and are also
far more efficient and conceptually simpler than the pair approximations (which
take second-order correlations into account) currently used in epidemiology.
The work described in this chapter has been submitted for publication in Phys.
Rev. E.

• In Chapter 5, in collaboration with Fabio Caccioli, Cristopher Moore and J.
5
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Doyne Farmer, we apply an approach similar to threshold models (Chapter 3)
to financial networks, studying when bankruptcies spread due to the sudden
devaluation of shared assets in overlapping portfolios. Our model estimates
the circumstances under which systemic instabilities are likely to occur as a
function of parameters such as leverage, market crowding, diversification, and
market impact. We predict that although diversification may be good for individual institutions, it can create dangerous systemic e↵ects, and as a result
financial contagion gets worse with too much diversification; additionally, financial system exhibits “robust yet fragile” behavior, with regions of the parameter
space where contagion is rare but catastrophic whenever it occurs.
The work described in this chapter was published in J. of Banking & Finance
Volume 46, (2014). [11].

• We conclude in Chapter 6 by summarizing our contributions and discussing
some open questions and potential directions towards future work.

6

Chapter 2
Background
If a man’s wit be wandering, let him study the mathematics.
- Francis Bacon

2.1

Epidemics in Networks

For the purpose of illustration, let us consider a simple recurrent state epidemic
model, the susceptible-infectious-susceptible (SIS) model. In this model, each individual or node is either Infectious (I) or Susceptible (S). Infectious nodes infect
their Susceptible neighbors independently at rate

and recover back independently

to a Susceptible state at rate ⇢. Note that this model becomes a non-recurrent
state model when infectious node do not recover from infection, i.e. the susceptibleinfectious (SI) model if the recovery rate is 0. We denote the probability that that i
is Infectious and Susceptible by Ii and Si respectively. Our goal then is to efficiently
and accurately compute these probabilities as a function of continuous time t.
The exact system of ordinary di↵erential equations for Ii , i.e. the master-
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equation, for SIS model is
X
dI i
= -⇢Ii +
[Si Ij ],
dt
j2@i

(2.1)

where @i are neighbors of i, and [Si Ij ] is the joint probability that i is Susceptible
and j is Infectious. The first term is the rate at which i independently recovers from
infection, whereas the second term refers to the rate at which if i is Susceptible, it
transition to become Infectious by getting infected from its neighbors.
However, although this system is exact, it is not closed, i.e. the marginal probability Ii depends on the two-point marginals [Si Ij ], whose time derivatives, as we
review below, depend in turn on three-point marginals, and so on.

2.2

First-order moment closure

In the first-order moment closure method, we assume (approximate) that neighboring
nodes are uncorrelated, i.e.,
[Si Ij ] ⇡ Si Ii .

(2.2)

Thus the ordinary di↵erential equation system via this first-order moment closure
becomes
X
dI i
= -⇢Ii + Si
Ij .
dt
j2@i

(2.3)

In some cases, this can be a reasonable assumption. For instance in a large complete
network, where every pair of nodes is connected by an edge, the state of the system
is essentially driven the fraction of individuals in a given compartmental state and
is equivalent to a fully mixed mean-field model.
But in some instances, we cannot ignore correlations. Consider, for example, a
simple but pathological case of the SI model where there are only two nodes in the
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Figure 2.1: Two simple, yet illustrative, cases of networks, where the darker node is
initially Infectious.

graph, i and j, with an edge between them as shown in Fig. 2.1. If the transmission
rate is , and if we assume the nodes are independent (i.e., if we use first-order
moment closure) we obtain the following di↵erential equations,

dI i
= S i Ij
dt
dI j
= S j Ii ,
dt

(2.4)

where Si (t) = 1 - Ii (t) and similarly for j.
Now suppose that j is initially Infectious with probability , and that i is initially
Susceptible, i.e., Ij (0) =

and Ii (0) = 0. Since in the SI model nodes never recover,

the infection will eventually spread from j to i, but only if i was Infectious in the
first place. Thus the marginals Ii (t) and Ij (t) should tend to

as t ! 1.

However, integrating Eq. (2.4) gives a di↵erent result. Once Ii becomes positive,
dIj /dt becomes positive as well, allowing i to infect j with the infection that it
received from j in the first place. As a result, Ij (t) approaches 1 as t ! 1. Thus the

“echo chamber” between i and j leads to the absurd result that j eventually becomes
Infectious, even though with probability 1 system.

9
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Second-order moment closure,
i.e. the pair approximation

One way to account for correlations between neighboring states, such as the echochamber e↵ects we discussed in the previous section, is by tracking the dynamics of
neighboring pairs [Si Ij ] as well. The ordinary di↵erential equation for the pair [Si Ij ]
in the SIS model is given by

d[Si Ij ]
= - (⇢ + )[Si Ij ] + ⇢[Ii Ij ] +
dt

X

[Si Sj Ik ] -

k2@j\i

X

[I` Si Ij ].

(2.5)

`2@i\j

But as we can see, the derivative of the pair [Si Ij ] depends on the three-point
marginals [Si Sj Ik ] and [I` Si Ij ]. In principle, we could again write the derivative of
these three-point marginals in terms of four-point marginals, and those of four-point
marginals in terms of five-point marginals, and so on for any finite network. But the
number of variables increases exponentially, as a result of which, we need to close this
hierarchical dependence of correlations at some level at the cost of some accuracy.
In the second-order moment closure, also known as the pair approximations, we
factor the triplet distribution [Si Sj Ik ] as

[Si Sj Ik ] '

[Si Sj ][Sj Ik ]
Sj

.

(2.6)

Therefore, the system of ordinary di↵erential equations for the SIS model via this
pair approximations becomes

10

Chapter 2.

Background

d[Si Ij ]
[Si Sj ] X
[S i I j ] X
= ⇢[Ii Ij ] - (⇢ + )[Si Ij ] +
[Sj Ik ] [Si I` ].
dt
Sj
Si
k2@j\i

`2@i\j

(2.7)

Note that the evolution of [Si Ij ] depends on other two-point marginals like [Ii Ij ]
and [Si Sj ]. But, by definition we have

Si = [Si Ij ] + [Si Sj ]

(2.8)

Ii = [Ii Sj ] + [Ii Ij ],

which, along with Eq. (2.1), closes the system at the level of pairs.
In the two-node example of Fig. 2.1 (left), of course, the pair approximation is
exact, since it maintains separate variables such as [Sj Ik ] for each of the joint states
of the two nodes. Now, consider a case with three nodes, as in Fig. 2.1 (right),
where j is the common neighbor of i and k. The pair-approximation assumes that
given j is Susceptible (as in the figure), the pairs [Si Sj ] and [Sj Ik ] are independent.
In non-recurrent models like SI, nodes do not revert back to the Susceptible state
once they transition out of it. So, knowing that j - being the only node between
i and k - is Susceptible is a sufficient condition to block all correlations between i
and k.
However, in a recurrent epidemic model, i and k could be correlated, for instance
if j infected them both and then returned to the Susceptible state. As a result, the
pair approximation is vulnerable to a distance-two echo chamber, where i and k
infect each other through j.
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Figure 2.2: We define messages on the directed edges of a network to carry causal
information of the flow of contagion, e.g. Ij!i is the probability that j is Infectious
because it received the infection from a neighbor k other than i. This prevents
e↵ects from immediately backtracking to the node they came from, and avoids “echo
chamber” infections.

2.4

Message-passing approach: a prelude

Well, it seemed to me quite evident that the idea that a particle acts on itself is not a
necessary one. And so I suggested to myself that electrons cannot act on themselves;
they can only act on other electrons.
- Richard Feynman

To prevent echo chamber e↵ects, we consider messages that are defined on the
directed edges of the network. The idea is to prevent infection signals from backtracking to the node that they immediately came from and thus avoid an echo chamber
of information flow.
This idea of making the flow of information directional in dynamic messagepassing is similar to belief propagation [24, 25], where we use the network structure
to update posterior probabilities of the vertices’ states. However, unlike belief propagation where we update posterior distributions according to Bayes’ rule, the causal
structure of information flow is captured directly by the time evolution of DMP. In
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other words, in DMP we write di↵erential equations for the messages over time. This
approach takes correlations between neighboring nodes into account while preventing
causal signals from backtracking to their immediate source, and thus avoids “echo
chamber e↵ects” where a pair of adjacent nodes each amplify the probability that
the other is infectious.
In the next two chapters, we present in detail and in a self-contained way, the
message-passing approach to models of epidemics in networks.
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Chapter 3
Message-passing for non-recurrent
threshold models of epidemics
The work described in this chapter is a result of collaboration with Cristopher Moore
and is published in Phys. Rev. E 89, 022805 (2014) [27]
Mathematical modeling of epidemics has attracted the interest of researchers
from diverse academic disciplines [1, 2, 16, 10, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 5,
11, 40, 41]. Epidemics range from outbreaks of infectious disease to the contagion of
social behaviors such as trends, memes, fads, political opinions, rumors, innovations,
financial decisions, and so on. In an early study, Granovetter [3, 4] proposed a
threshold model, where individuals adopt a behavior when they are informed by at
least T of their neighbors.
We consider a stochastic model similar to Granovetter’s with a trend propagating
on a network. At each time, an individual has integer valued awareness of a trend
ranging from 0 to T . Each time an individual is informed by one of its neighbors,
this awareness is incremented until it reaches the threshold T . At that point, that
individual adopts the trend, and starts informing its neighbors about it. We will

14

Chapter 3.

Message-passing for non-recurrent threshold models of epidemics

0
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3

4

5

Figure 3.1: Schematic illustration of the evolution of contagion in a finite network,
where individuals have threshold T = 2. Adopters are colored red. For simplicity, we
assume adopters inform their neighbors one time step after they become adopters.
In fact we study a stochastic continuous-time version of this model.

assume that the network topology is fixed, but our model of information flow (or
“contagion”) is probabilistic. Each adopter informs each of its neighbors at a rate
r(⌧), where ⌧ is the time elapsed since it became an adopter. Since r(⌧) may depend
on ⌧, the resulting dynamics can be non-Markovian. In an illustrative example, we
show a schematic evolution of the contagion in Figure 3.1, where T = 2.
Given an initial condition, where some individuals have already become adopters,
or have done so with some probability, our goal in this chapter is to calculate the
probability that any given individual i is an adopter (or not an adopter) as a function
of time. More generally, we calculate the probability Pai (t) that i has awareness a
at time t. Then the probability that i is an adopter is PTi .
Calculating the time evolution of the probability Pai (t) is non-trivial as a result
of intrinsic nonlinearities in the dynamics. The heterogeneous network interactions
between individuals make it even harder. One simple way to estimate these probabilities is to put on a computational-frequentist hat, simulate the model many times
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independently by a Monte Carlo agent-based method, and measure in what fraction
of these runs each vertex becomes an adopter. Doing this is computationally costly,
however, as we are required to perform many independent runs of the simulation
We thus consider the dynamic message passing algorithm (DMP), where we evolve
the probabilities Pai (t) directly according to certain update equations. Compared to
a Monte Carlo simulation that requires many independent runs, we only need to run
the DMP algorithm once. In the special case where T = 1, DMP was recently formulated by Karrer and Newman [42] to analytically study non-Markovian dynamics
of the Susceptible, Infected, Recovered (SIR) epidemic model of the networks. In an
analogy with the SIR model, we sometimes refer to a vertex as susceptible if it is not
yet an adopter, infected if it is an adopter, and recovered if it is an adopter but the
rate r(⌧) at which it informs its neighbors has dropped to zero.
The underlying idea of dynamic message passing is similar to belief propagation
[24, 25], where we use the network structure to update posterior probabilities of
the vertices’ states. However, unlike belief propagation where we update posterior
distributions according to Bayes’ rule, the causal structure of information flow is
captured directly by the time iteration of DMP. As in belief propagation, the DMP
algorithm assumes that the neighbors of each vertex are conditionally independent
of each other. As a result, like belief propagation, DMP is exact on trees and approximate on networks with loops, where the conditional independence assumption
cannot capture higher order correlations.
However, as we will see, DMP gives good approximations to the probabilities
even on real networks with many loops. We will show this by implementing it in
a real social network, specifically Zachary’s karate club network [43]. Although the
Zachary’s club network contains many loops, the probabilities computed by DMP
compare well with those from the Monte Carlo simulation. We present this in Section
3.2.
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In the limit of large random networks in the Erdős-Rényi model, or networks with
a given degree distribution, DMP is asymptotically exact because these networks are
locally treelike. In Section 3.3, we use DMP to obtain the exact results for such
random networks in the thermodynamic limit.

3.0.1

Related Work

There are many related studies that consider what fraction of vertices eventually become adopters if each neighbor informs them with probability p. The set of eventual
adopters are the ones who have at least T neighbors who are also adopters. This
is reminiscent of the model commonly studied in statistical physics as k-core (or
bootstrap) percolation. The k-core is the maximal induced subgraph in the network,
such that each vertex has at least k other neighbors in the subgraph.
By deleting each edge with probability 1 - p independently, we can ask whether
the resulting diluted network in the thermodynamic limit contains an extensive kcore in the ensemble of similarly prepared networks. Interestingly for k > 3, the
emergence of a k-core in random networks is a first-order (discontinuous) phase
transition in the sense that when it first appears it covers a finite fraction of the
network [44]. An early work on k-core percolation was on the Bethe lattice in the
context of magnetic systems [45]. Recently, it has been used in studies of the Ising
model and nucleation [46, 47], analysis of zero temperature jamming transitions
[48], and in a bootstrap percolation model in square lattices and random graphs
[49, 50, 51, 39, 52].
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Message-passing approach

We now formulate the dynamic message passing (DMP) technique for the threshold
models. We define the message Ui

j (t)

as the probability that vertex j has not

informed i about the trend by time t. If we have Ui

j (t)

for all neighboring pairs

i, j, we will be able to calculate the marginal probability Pai (t) that i has awareness
a at time t, i.e. that it has been informed by a of its neighbors. We focus on initial
conditions where each vertex is either an adopter or has awareness zero. So given
that i is not an initial adopter,
Pai (t) =

X Y

(1 - Ui

j (t))

⇥✓@i j2⇥
|⇥|=a

Y

Ui

j (t).

(3.1)

j2@i\⇥

Here, @i is the set of i’s neighbors, and ⇥ ranges over all subsets of @i of size a.
Note the conditional independence assumption in Equation (3.1), where we assume
that the events that j has informed (or not informed) i are independent. That is, we
assume that the probability that i has been informed by a given set of neighbors ⇥
is the product over j 2 ⇥ and j 2
/ ⇥ of the probability that j has or has not informed
i respectively.
Given that i is not an initial adopter, the probability PSi (t) that the vertex i is
susceptible at time t, i.e. its awareness is less than T at time t, is then
PSi (t)

=

T -1
X

Pai (t).

(3.2)

a=0

Equivalently,
PSi (t) =

X Y

⇥✓@i j2⇥
|⇥|<T

(1 - Ui

j (t))

Y

Ui

j (t).

(3.3)

j2@i\⇥

We can see that this expression is easy to generalize to the case where each individual
has its own threshold Ti . For instance, we could set Ti to some fraction of i’s degree.
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We could also assume a probabilistic threshold Ti for each i drawn from some distribution P(Ti ) and take an average over the threshold in Equation (3.1). We can also
capture the case where i initially has awareness ai by setting Ti = T - ai . However,
for simplicity, we assume that every individual has the same threshold, and everyone
starts with an initial awareness of 0 or T .
Given PSi (t), we note that i is an adopter if it is at the root of a T -ary tree, whose
nodes are mapped onto the vertices of the network, such that 1) the leaves of the
tree are initial adopters, 2) the T children of each tree node are mapped to distinct
vertices, 3) none of the paths from the root to the leaves backtracks; that is, an
edge (u, v) cannot be immediately followed by the edge (v, u), and 4) the trend is
successfully transmitted along each edge of this tree.
To capture the information flow that the message Ui

j (t)

represents, we define

j\i

PS (t), which is the probability that j would be susceptible at time t if i were absent
from the network. Alternately, this is the probability that j is susceptible at time t
if we ignore the possibility of j being informed of the trend by i. In removing the
vertex i (or ignoring the flow of information to j from i), we bring the information
flow to i based on the information or messages that neighbor j receives from j’s other
neighbors. We thus avoid the “echo-chamber” e↵ect, where i informs j, and j informs
i back, and so on.
j\i

In an analogy with the cavity method of statistical physics, we call PS (t) the
cavity probability that j is susceptible given that i is in a noninteracting “cavity
j\i

state”. Hence, using Equation (3.3), if j was not an initial adopter, then PS can be
written as
j\i

PS (t) =

X

Y

⇥✓@j\i `2⇥
|⇥|<T

(1 - Uj

Y

` (t))

Uj

` (t).

(3.4)

`2@j\{⇥,i}

j\i

Note that initially PS (0) = PSj (0), since the initial probability that j is an an adopter
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j\i

does not depend on i. Similarly, the cavity rate pI (t) at which j becomes an adopter
at time t, if it was not an adopter initially, is then
j\i

j\i
pI (t)

dP (t)
=- S
.
dt

(3.5)

It is convenient to define f(⌧) as the rate at which j first informs i at time t, if
j became an adopter at time t 0 = t - ⌧. In particular, if j informs i at a rate r(⌧),
then f(⌧) = r(⌧)e-

R⌧

d⌧ 0 r(⌧ 0 )

is the rate at which j informs i for the first time at time
R1
t. Note that f(⌧) might not be normalized, since the probability p = 0 d⌧f(⌧) that
0

j ever informs i may be less than 1. By letting f(⌧) depend arbitrarily on the time
⌧ since j became an adopter, we can handle both Markovian and non-Markovian
models. In particular, if an adopter inform its neighbors at some constant rate

,

we have
f(⌧) = e-

⌧

.

(3.6)

If an adopter “recovers” with rate

as in the SIR model, after which it no longer

informs its neighbors about the trend, then f(⌧) becomes
f(⌧) = e-(
where e-

⌧

+ )⌧

,

(3.7)

is the probability that an adopter has itself not recovered up to the

elapsed time ⌧. Note in general we can let f(⌧) depend on i and j, giving arbitrary
inhomogeneous rates at which individuals inform each other; we do not pursue this
here.
Although we have defined the messages and shown how they allow us to calculate the probabilities Pai (t), we have not yet shown how to calculate the messages
themselves.
So, let us now calculate the messages Ui

j (t).

The rate at which Ui

j (t)

de-

creases at time t is the rate at which j informs i for the first time at time t. This
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happens in two ways. If j was an initial adopter, it informs i for the first time at
time t at the rate f(t). Or, if j was initially susceptible, j becomes an adopter at
some time t 0 = t - ⌧, and informs i for the first time at the rate f(t - t 0 ) at time t.
Integrating this over t 0 up to time t, we see that j will inform i for the first time at
Rt
j\i
the rate 0 dt 0 f(t - t 0 )pI (t 0 ). Combining these two cases with Equation (3.5), the
rate at which the message Ui

j (t)

decreases at time t is thus given by

dUi j (t)
= f(t)[1 - PSj (0)] + PSj (0)
dt
= f(t)[1 - PSj (0)] - PSj (0)

Zt
0
Zt

j\i

dt 0 f(t - t 0 )pI (t 0 )
j\i

dt 0 f(t - t 0 )

0

dPS (t 0 )
.
dt 0

(3.8)

Integrating by parts gives
dUi j (t)
j\i
= -f(t) + f(0)PSj (0)PS (t)
dt
Z
+

PSj (0)

t

0

j\i

dt 0 PS (t 0 )

df(t - t 0 )
.
dt

(3.9)

One may check that the solution of (3.9) is
Ui

j (t)

=1-

Zt
0

d⌧f(⌧) +

PSj (0)

Zt
0

j\i

(3.10)

d⌧f(⌧)PS (t - ⌧).

We can explain this expression, as in [42], as follows. The term 1 -

Rt
0

d⌧f(⌧) is

the probability that the elapsed time ⌧, after which j informs i for the first time, is
greater than the absolute time t, i.e. ⌧ > t. In this case, i is not informed by j,
even if j became an adopter before time t. The second term is the probability that i
would have been informed at time t if j had been an adopter at time t - ⌧, but that
j was not yet an adopter at that time.
Note however that Equation (3.9) is an integro-di↵erential equation, so numerically integrating it can be computationally costly. It is possible to numerically
integrate (3.10), or, for particular functions f(⌧), we can transform (3.9) into an
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Figure 3.2: Comparison (right) with a scatter plot of individuals eventual infection
probability in the Zachary club (left), where threshold T = 2. Horizontal axis is the
eventual infection probability calculated by the DMP, whereas vertical axis is the
result from the Monte Carlo simulation. Each point refers to the eventual infection
probability of one of the individuals in the club. Here, four initially infected individuals are {0, 1, 32, 33}. Simulation is averaged over 105 runs. Transmission rate =
0.6, and recovery rate = 0.3. Vertices on the left are colored according to their
eventual infection probability from the DMP.

ordinary di↵erential equation. For example if we plug f(⌧) from (3.7) and integrate
the last term in (3.9) by parts, we obtain
dUi j (t)
= - Ui
dt

j (t)

+ (1 - Ui

So, given the initial conditions Ui

j (0)

j (t))

j\i

+ PSj (0)PS (t)

(3.11)

and PSi (0), we numerically integrate this or

(3.9) to compute Pai (t), PSi (t), and PTi (t) using (3.1) and (3.3) respectively.

3.2

Message passing vs Monte Carlo simulation in
real networks

The message passing formulation in Section 3.1 is exact only on trees, since we
assumed that the probabilities Pai (t) are independent. However, typical networks
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Figure 3.3: Same parameters and initial conditions as Fig. 3.2, except that we are
comparing the infection probability at time t = 2.

contain many loops. Thus, the independence assumption of the message passing
approach is an approximation in real networks. Our goal in this section is to see how
accurate DMP is in real networks by comparing it with Monte Carlo simulations of
the actual stochastic process.

Figure 3.4: Same as Fig. 3.2, where we compare individuals probability of eventually getting infected. Here the initial condition is such that each is infected with
probability 0.2.
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Figure 3.5: We show the eventual infection probability of each individual (horizontal
axis) in the Zachary karate club network at increasing uniform probability (vertical
axis) of getting infected initially. Here, threshold T = 2, transmission rate = 0.6,
and recovery rate = 0.3. On the left is the result calculated through the DMP.
Whereas, on the right, we show the result from the Monte Carlo simulations, where
the probabilities are averaged over 105 runs for each initial infection probability.

To compare the results between DMP and Monte Carlo simulations, we show the
infection probability of each individual calculated through both methods in a scatter
plot. In Fig. 3.2, we compare the eventual infection (adoption) probability of each
individual in Zachary’s karate club network. Each point in the scatter plot refers
to the eventual infection probability of an individual in the club. If the DMP were
exact, all points in the figure would lie exactly on the dotted diagonal line.
Here, each individual’s threshold T is set to 2. Four vertices labeled {0, 1, 32, 33}
in Fig. 3.2 (left) are the initially infected individuals. We assume f(⌧) = e-(
with a transmission rate

= 0.6 and a recovery rate

+ )⌧

= 0.3. We simulate the actual

stochastic process using a continuous-time Monte Carlo method algorithm. Events
are maintained in a priority queue using a heap data structure to sort the events
in the model: specifically, sort the edges (i, j) according to the time at which j will
inform i. The probabilities are then averaged over 105 independent runs.
In Fig. 3.3, using the same parameters and initial conditions as Fig. 3.2, we
compare the infection probability of each individual at a particular finite time t = 2.
We chose this time because this is when the average number of infected individuals
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is at its maximum.
In Fig. 3.4, we again use the same parameters as Fig. 3.2, but with di↵erent
initial conditions. Each individual is initially infected with probability 0.2. There
are now two sources of randomness in the model: the dynamics and the set of
initial adopters. This again forces us to do many independent runs of the Monte
Carlo simulation to estimate the infection probabilities. By setting PSi (0) = 0.8 in
Equation (3.3) however, we can calculate the infection probability with the same
computational cost as before where the initial infectors were fixed. Accordingly in
Fig. 3.5, we show the density plot of the probability that each individual (horizontal
axis) is eventually infected, when each of them is initially infected with increasing
probability (vertical axis).

3.2.1

A note on correlations for threshold models

Checking the scatter plot of the results computed from DMP and Monte Carlo simulation in Figures 3.2 - 3.4, we first see that the results computed from DMP do not
match perfectly with those from the simulation. As pointed out in [42], where T = 1
the probability estimated by DMP is always an upper bound on the true probability,
since the events that two or more neighbors become infected are positively correlated.
However, for T > 1 the situation is more complicated, and DMP does not necessarily give an upper bound on the infection probability. Indeed, in Figs. 3.2–3.4,
we see several cases when DMP underestimates the infection probability rather than
overestimating it. This includes the vertices labeled {26} in Fig. 3.2, {12, 26, 27, 28}
in Fig. 3.3, and {5, 6, 16} in Fig. 3.4.
To see why this happens, suppose i has two neighbors, j and k. Let P[i] denote
the probability that i becomes infected, and let P[j] and P[k] denote the probabilities

25

Chapter 3.

Message-passing for non-recurrent threshold models of epidemics

that j and k inform i respectively. If T = 1, then
P[i] = P[j _ k] = P[j] + P[k] - P[j ^ k].
Let’s assume that DMP computes the right marginals, so that PDMP [j] = P[j] and
PDMP [k] = P[k]. However, DMP ignores correlations, and assumes that these events
are independent. Thus
PDMP [i] = P[j] + P[k] - P[j]P[k].
However, j and k are positively correlated if they have a common neighbor that may
have infected them both, or if they are neighbors of each other. That is,
P[j ^ k] > P[j]P[k].
Then P[i] < PDMP [i], and DMP overestimates P[i]. On the other hand, if T = 2, then
P[i] = P[j ^ k] > P[j]P[k] = PDMP [i],
and DMP underestimates P[i].
Similarly, suppose i has three neighbors, j, k, and `. Again taking T = 2, we have
P[i] = P[j ^ k] + P[j ^ `] + P[k ^ `] - 2P[j ^ k ^ `],
whereas, DMP gives
PDMP [i] = P[j]P[k] + P[j]P[`] + P[k]P[`] - 2P[j]P[k]P[`].
In this case, DMP can either underestimate or overestimate P[i], depending on the
strength of the correlations between its neighbors. For example, if ` is independent
of j and k, then
P[i] = P[j ^ k] + P[j]P[`] + P[k]P[`] - 2P[j ^ k]P[`]
= P[j ^ k](1 - 2P[`]) + (P[j] + P[k])P[`].
If j and k are positively correlated so that P[j ^ k] > P[j]P[k], then DMP underestimates P[i] if P[`] < 1/2 and overestimates it if P[`] > 1/2.
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Exact solution in networks with arbitrary degree distributions

In this section, we consider the message passing approach in the ensemble of random
networks in the thermodynamic limit. Our goal is to show that DMP can be applied
to large random networks just as well as to a particular finite network.
In random networks, we are interested in the expected behavior of the dynamics
rather than the dynamics in a single realization of the network. So, instead of computing messages for individual vertices, we assume that these messages are drawn
from some probability distribution, and update this distribution based on their average behavior. We can then compute the distribution of marginals as well.
We consider random networks with a given degree distribution, specifically an
ensemble of networks called the configuration model [53]. Each of n vertices is first
assigned an integer degree from a specified degree distribution, say pk . We think of
a vertex with degree k as having k “spokes” or half-edges coming out of it. We then
choose a uniformly random matching of these 2m spokes with each other, where m is
the number of edges in the network. The key fact is then that, in the thermodynamic
limit, i.e. n ! 1, following an edge from any given vertex connects with a vertex
of degree k with probability proportional to kpk . Strictly speaking, this model
generates random multigraphs. But, the average size of such graphs is a constant as

n ! 1, as a result of which the density of self-loops and multiple edges vanishes
when n is large.

Now, consider the message Ui

j (t)

from Equation (3.10). Recall that this is the

probability that j has not informed i by time t. In the configuration model however,
di↵erent individuals j are connected to i in di↵erent realizations of the network. But,
edges are now statistically identical in the sense that each edge identically connects
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to a vertex based on its degree. So, we consider a single average message U(t).
This average message U(t) then has the following interpretation. It is the average
probability that by following a random edge, the neighbor we reach has not informed
the vertex we came from by time t. This in turn will tell us the probability Pa (t)
that a randomly chosen vertex has awareness a at time t. However, this probability
depends on the degree of the vertex: specifically, if it has degree k, then
✓ ◆
k
Pa (k, t) = PS (0)
U(t)k-a (1 - U(t))a .
a

(3.12)

Averaging over pk , we get
Pa (t) = PS (0)

1
X
k

✓ ◆
k
pk
U(t)k-a (1 - U(t))a .
a

(3.13)

It is useful to write this in terms of the generating function G(x) of the degree
distribution and its derivatives:
G(x) =

X

pk xk ,

(3.14)

da G(x)
.
dxa

(3.15)

k

G(a) (x) =

Then Pa (t) can be written as
Pa (t) = PS (0)

(1 - U(t))a (a)
G (U(t)).
a!

(3.16)

Thus the probability PS (t) that a randomly chosen vertex is susceptible at time t is
PS (t) =

T -1
X

(3.17)

Pa (t).

a=0

Equivalently,
PS (t) = PS (0)

T -1
X
(1 - U(t))a
a=0

a!

G(a) (U(t)).

(3.18)

So, we see that given U(t), computing Pa (t) and PS (t) in the configuration model
reduces to knowing G(a) to some order.
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To capture the information flow that U(t) represents in the configuration model,
we define the cavity probability Q(t) by simplifying Equation (3.4). This is the
probability that a randomly chosen edge leads to a vertex that has not been infected
by time t, if the vertex we came from is assumed to be absent from the network.
Equivalently, Q(t) is the probability that if we follow a random edge from a vertex
i, the vertex j it leads to has been informed by at most T - 1 of its neighbors other
than i. This probability also depends on j’s degree. Namely, if it has degree k + 1,
then
T -1 ✓ ◆
X
k
Q(k, t) =
U(t)k-a (1 - U(t))a ,
a
a=0

(3.19)

where k is the number of neighbors that j has other than i. As discussed above, a
random edge leads to a vertex with degree k with probability proportional to kpk .
Therefore, the probability that j has k neighbors other than i is
qk =

(k + 1)pk+1
(k + 1)pk+1
P
=
.
G(1) (1)
k kpk

(3.20)

Averaging Q(k, t) over qk , we obtain
Q(t) =

X
k

T -1 ✓ ◆
X
k
qk
U(t)k-a (1 - U(t))a .
a
a=0

(3.21)

Similar to Equation (3.18), we can write Q(t) in terms of the generating function as
Q(t) =

1

T -1
X
(1 - U(t))a

G(1) (1) a=0

a!

G(a+1) (U(t)).

(3.22)

We now calculate U(t) by simplifying (i.e. averaging) Equation (3.10) for the
configuration model. But, note the right-hand side of (3.10) consists of products
of U(t), and the average of products is not always the product of averages. In the
limit n ! 1 however, the network is locally treelike in the sense that the typical
size of the shortest loops diverges as O(log n). As a result, U(t) is asymptotically
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independent, and the average of products is equal to the product of averages. So,
the self-consistent relation for U(t) becomes
Zt
Zt
U(t) = 1 - d⌧f(⌧) + PS (0) dt 0 f(t - t 0 )Q(t 0 ).
0

(3.23)

0

To numerically integrate this equation in time, we di↵erentiate it with respect to t,
dU(t)
= -f(t) + PS (0)f(0)Q(t)
dt
Z
t

dt 0 Q(t 0 )

+ PS (0)

0

df(t - t 0 )
.
dt

(3.24)

It is also possible to get this from Equation (3.9). We can further simplify this to an
ordinary di↵erential equation in some cases. For example, if f(⌧) =

e-(

+ )⌧

, we

can write it as
dU(t)
= - U(t) + (1 - U(t)) + PS (0)Q(t).
dt

(3.25)

So, given the initial conditions U(0) = 1, PS (0), and G(a) (x), we can calculate
PS (t) using Equation (3.18). Similarly, the fraction of infected and recovered vertices
at time t can be calculated. Note that, in general, we can let f(⌧) depend on the
degree of the vertex by following a degree dependent transmission method formulated
by Newman [16]. Similarly, we can allow for the case where the probability PT (0) =
1 - PS (0) of getting initially infected depends on the degree of the vertex.
In Fig. 3.6 (left), we show the time evolution of the fraction of susceptible (blue),
infected (red), and recovered (green) vertices in the configuration model, where the
degrees are drawn from the Poisson distribution with mean c, or equivalently the
Erdős-Rényi graphs G(n, p = c/n). For Poisson distribution, G(a) (x) are given by
ca e-c(1-x) . We take c = 9, T = 3, f(⌧) = e-(

+ )⌧

, where

= 0.8 and

= 0.2,

and the initial fraction of adopters/infecteds is PT (0) = 0.1.
Continuous lines in Fig. 3.6 (left) are obtained by numerically integrating Equation (3.25), whereas dots are from Monte Carlo simulations with 104 vertices aver-
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Figure 3.6: On the left is the dynamics in the Erdős-Rényi graphs G(n, p = c/n)
where individuals have threshold T = 3, average degree c = 9, initial fraction of
adopters/infecteds PT (0) = 0.1. The fractions of infected, recovered and susceptible
vertices are red, green, blue respectively. Continuous lines are analytic results calculated using our DMP approach, by numerically integrating Equation (3.25), whereas
dots are from the Monte Carlo based simulations with 104 vertices averaged over 100
runs. Transmission rate = 0.8, and recovery rate = 0.2. On the right is the
time evolution of Pa (t), where continuous lines are calculated using Equation (3.16).
Root Mean Square deviations in the simulation are provided when they are larger
than the markers.

aged over 100 runs. Similarly, Fig. 3.6 (right) gives the fraction Pa (t) of vertices
with awareness a, where the continuous lines are obtained by using Equation (3.16).
In Fig. 3.7, we show the fraction PT (t) of adopters as a function of time for the
same parameter values as Fig. 3.6, except where T is 1 (green square), 2 (blue circle),
3 (magneta triangle), and 4 (black diamond). Root Mean Square deviations in the
simulation are provided when they are larger than the the markers.
Using the same framework, we can calculate the asymptotic probability u =
U(1) that the infection has not been transmitted along a random edge. This in turn
will tell us the asymptotic probability that a randomly chosen vertex ever becomes
infected.
We can think of the long time behavior as k-core percolation. Either the edge is
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Figure 3.7: Same parameters and initial conditions as Fig. 3.6, except we are computing the fraction PT (t) of adopters, i.e. either infected or recovered vertices, as a
function of time when the threshold T is 1 (green square), 2 (blue circle), 3 (magneta
triangle), and 4 (black diamond).

closed in the sense that its other endpoint fails to inform the vertex we came from,
R1
which happens with the probability 1 - p = 1 - 0 f(⌧)d⌧. In this case, it does not

matter if the neighbor gets infected by its other neighbors, since it fails to inform the
vertex we came from. Or, it can be the case that the edge is open (with probability
p), but the vertex we reach is itself not infected eventually by its other neighbors.
This happens when the neighbor we reach by randomly following the edge is informed
by at most T - 1 other neighbors, provided it was not initially infected. Summing
up both cases, we arrive at the following self-consistent relation for u:
u = 1 - p + pPS (0)
=1-p+

1
X

T -1 ✓ ◆
X
k k-a
qk
u
(1 - u)a
a
a=0

k
T
-1
X

pPS (0)
(1 - u)a (a+1)
G
(u).
G(1) (1) a=0
a!

(3.26)

Note that we could have written this equally by taking the limit t ! 1 in Equation (3.23). Similarly, the probability PS that a randomly chosen vertex never gets
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infected, i.e. the fraction of susceptible vertices is
PS = PS (0)

T -1
X
(1 - u)a
a=0

a!

G(a) (u).

(3.27)

For Erdős-Rényi networks G(n, p = c/n), or equivalently the Poisson distribution
with average degree c, we have the following self-consistent relation for u:
-c(1-u)

u = 1 - p + pPS (0)e

T -1 a
X
c (1 - u)a

a!

a=0

.

(3.28)

We can also obtain this expression by following [52]. Similarly, PS in Erdős-Rényi
networks is
PS = PS (0)e

-c(1-u)

T -1 a
X
c (1 - u)a
a=0

a!

.

(3.29)

Equations (3.26) and (3.27) have a nice interpretation in terms of well-studied
problems in random graphs, including percolation and the emergence of the k-core.
We say that Equation (3.26) is the generating function in PS (0) of the size of the
connected component of susceptible vertices by following a random edge in the long
time limit. Similarly, Equation (3.27) is the generating function of the size of the
connected susceptible component of a randomly chosen vertex.
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Message-passing for recurrent
epidemics
The work described in this chapter is a result of collaboration with Samuel V. Scarpino
and Cristopher Moore is submitted for publication in Phys. Rev. E.
For many epidemic models, such as SI (susceptible-infectious), SIR (susceptibleinfectious-recovered) and SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered), only oneway state changes can occur. For example, in the SIR model, once an individual
has left the Susceptible class and become Infectious, they cannot return to being
Susceptible; once they become Recovered, they are immune to future infections, and
might as well be Removed. For these non-recurrent models, DMP is known to be be
an efficient algorithm to estimate Ii (t), and it is exact on trees [26]; it can also be
applied to threshold models [27, 29, 30] and used for inference [19].
However, for many real-world diseases individuals can return to previously inhabited states. In these recurrent models, such as SIS (susceptible-infectious-susceptible)
, SIRS (susceptible-infectious-recovered-susceptible), and SEIS (susceptible-exposedinfectious-susceptible), individuals can cycle through the states multiple times, giving
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multiple waves of infection traveling through the population. The most obvious examples of recurrent models are seasonal influenza, where due to the evolution of the
virus individuals are repeatedly infected during their lifetime [70], vaccination where
protective immunity wanes over time [71], and diseases curable by treatment which
does not result in antibody-mediated immunity, such as gonorrhea [76]. In all three
cases, individuals leave the Susceptible class, only to return at some point in the
future (although for influenza, it is worth mentioning that if the evolutionary rate
of the virus is functionally related to the number of susceptible individuals, then the
recovery rate may not be independent from the state of one’s neighbors.) Unfortunately, the DMP approach of [26] cannot be directly extended to recurrent models,
since their equations for messages only track the first time an individual makes the
transition to a given state.

The purpose of this chapter is to develop a novel DMP algorithm for recurrent
models of epidemics on networks, which we call rDMP. We will show that rDMP
gives very good approximations for marginal probabilities on networks, and is often
more accurate than the pair approximation. Moreover, whereas the pair approximation requires keeping track of mk2 variables, if there are m edges and k states per
node, rDMP requires just 2mk variables. For complex models where k is large—for
instance, for diseases with multiple stages of infection or immunity, or multipledisease epidemics where one disease makes individuals more susceptible to another
one—this gives a substantial reduction in the computational e↵ort required. Finally,
the rDMP approach is conceptually simple, making it easy to write down the system
of di↵erential equations for a wide variety of epidemic models.
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Message-passing and preventing
the echo chamber e↵ect

As shown in Fig. 2.2, the variables of rDMP are messages along directed edges of the
network (in addition to one-point marginals). For instance, Ij!i is the probability
that j is Infectious because it was infected by one of its other neighbors k. The
intuition behind this is the following, where we take the SIS model as an example.
If i is Susceptible, the rate at which j will infect i is proportional to the probability
Ij that j is infected. But when computing this rate, we only include the contribution

to Ij that comes from neighbors other than i. In other words, we deliberately neglect
the event that j receives the infection from i, and immediately passes it back to i,
even if i has become Susceptible in the intervening time.
This choice avoids a kind of “echo chamber” e↵ect, where neighboring nodes
artificially amplify each others’ probability of being Infectious which we discussed in
chapter 2.1.
In other words, consider again the two-node case as shown in Fig. 2.1. Here, with
DMP, we fix the e↵ect of “echo chamber” by replacing Ii and Ij with the messages
they send each other,
dI i
= Si Ij!i ,
dt
dI j
= Sj Ii!j ,
dt
so that i can only infect j if i received the infection from some node other than j.
(Below we give the equations on a general network, including the time derivatives
of the messages.) In this example, there are no other nodes, so if Ij!i (0) =
Ii!j (0) = 0, then Ij (t) =

and

for all t as it should be.

Note that we do not claim that rDMP is exact in this case. In particular, as
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in (2.4), Ii (t) tends to 1 as t ! 1. This is because, unlike the system of [26], rDMP
assumes that the events that j infects i at di↵erent times are independent.

Preventing backtracking completely may seem like a strong assumption, and in recurrent models it is a priori possible, for instance, for a node to re-infect the neighbor
it was infected by. Despite the well-documented importance of recurrent infections
for diseases including (but certainly not limited to) seasonal influenza [70], Plasmodium malaria [78], and urinary tract infections [77], little is known about the source of
recurrent infections. For certain sexually transmitted diseases such as gonorrhea [76]
and repeated ringworm infections [79], there is evidence that backtracking plays a
significant role; on the other hand, it may be that recurrent infections are caused
by di↵erent strains, each of which is acting essentially without backtracking. Thus
while our non-backtracking assumption is clearly invalid in some cases, we believe it
is a reasonable approach for most recurrent state infections.

4.2

The rDMP equations for the SIS, SIRS, and
SEIS models

In this section, we illustrate the rDMP approach for several recurrent epidemic models. We start with the simplest one: in the SIS model, each node is either Infectious
(I) or Susceptible (S). Infectious nodes infect their Susceptible neighbors at rate ,
and their infections wane back into the Susceptible state at rate ⇢. We denote the
probability that that node i is Infectious or Susceptible by Ii and Si respectively.
The objective then is to efficiently and accurately compute these probabilities as a
function of time t.
We define variables or “messages” that live on the directed edges (i, j) of the
network. The directed nature of these messages prevent infection from backtracking
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from an Infectious node back to its infection source, e.g., if node i infects node j,
then we prevent j from re-infecting i. In addition to tracking the one-point marginal
Ij , we define a message Ij!i from j to i as the probability that j is in the Infectious

state as a result of being infected from one of its neighbors other than i. Given these
incoming messages, the rate at which Ii evolves in time is given by
X
dI i
= -⇢Ii + Si
Ij!i ,
dt
j2@i

(4.1)

where @i denotes the neighbors of i. Similarly, the rate at which Ij!i evolves in time
is given by
X
dIj!i
= -⇢Ij!i + Sj
Ik!j ,
dt

(4.2)

k2@j\i

where k 2 @j \ i denotes the neighbors of j excluding i.
For the SIRS model, we let ⇢ and

denote the transition rates from Infectious to

Recovered and from Recovered to Susceptible respectively. Then the rDMP system
for the SIRS model is given by
X
dIj!i
= -⇢Ij!i + Sj
Ik!j ,
dt

(4.3)

k2@j\i

which is coupled with the one-point marginals through
X
dS i
= Ri - S i
Ij!i
dt
j2@i
X
dI i
= -⇢Ii + Si
Ij!i
dt
j2@i

dR i
= ⇢Ii - Ri .
dt

(4.4)

In the SEIS model, upon becoming exposed to an infected neighbor, Susceptible
nodes first go through a latent period called the Exposed state. In this state, individuals are infected but not yet Infectious. Exposed nodes become Infectious at the
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rate ", and Infectious nodes again wane back to Susceptible at rate ⇢. The rDMP
system for the SEIS model is
X
dEj!i
= -"Ej!i + Sj
Ik!j ,
dt
k2@j\i

dIj!i
= -⇢Ij!i + "Ej!i ,
dt

(4.5)

which is coupled with the one-point marginals as
X
dS i
= ⇢Ii - Si
Ij!i
dt
j2@i

dI i
= -⇢Ii + "Ei
dt
X
dE i
= -"Ii + Si
Ij!i .
dt
j2@i

(4.6)

Note that here we track messages for the Exposed state, in addition to one-point
marginals, since they act as precursors for the Infectious messages. There is no need
to track messages for the Susceptible state, since it does not cause state changes in
its neighbors.
Generalizing these equations to more complex epidemic models with k di↵erent
states, as opposed to three or four, is straightforward. Even in a model where every
state can cause state changes in its neighbors—for instance, where having Susceptible
neighbors speeds up the rate of recovery, or where Exposed nodes can also infect their
neighbors at a lower rate—the total number of variables we need to track in a network
with n nodes and m edges is at most 2mk in addition to the nk one-point marginals.
In contrast, the pair approximation requires mk2 states to keep track of the joint
distribution of every neighboring pair.
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Experiments in real and synthetic networks

In this section we report on numerical experiments for rDMP for the SIS and SIRS
models on real and synthetic networks. As a performance metric, we use the average L1 error per node between the marginals computed from rDMP and the true
probabilities computed (up to sampling error) using continuous-time Monte Carlo
simulations. That is,
1 X MC
LrDMP
(t)
=
I (t) - IrDMP
(t) ,
1
i
n i i

(4.7)

We use this metric to compare the performance of rDMP with the independent-node
approximation and the pair approximation, or equivalently first- and second-order
moment closure [18, 58]. As we will see, for a wide range of parameters, rDMP is
more accurate than either of these approaches, even though it is computationally
easier than the pair approximation.
In Fig. 4.1, we show results for the SIS model on Zachary’s Karate Club [63].
On the left, we show the marginal probability that a particular node is Infectious
as a function of time, estimated by rDMP and by first- and second-order moment
closure, and compared with the true marginals given by Monte Carlo simulation.
On the right, we show the average L1 error for the three methods. Here

= 0.1,

⇢ = 0.05, and the initial condition consists of a single infected node (shown in red in
the inset). The Monte Carlo results were averaged over 105 runs. We see that rDMP
is significantly more accurate than the other two, except at some early times when
the pair approximation marginally outperforms rDMP.
As a further illustration, in Fig. 4.2 we show the steady-state marginal Ii for each
node i (measured by running the system until t = 50, at which point Ii (t) is nearly
constant), with the same parameters and initial condition as in Fig. 4.1. We show
the true marginal of each node on the y-axis, and the marginals estimated by rDMP
and the pair approximation on the x-axis. If the estimated marginals were perfectly
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Figure 4.1: Results on the SIS model. On the left, the marginal probability that node
29 in Zachary’s Karate club (see inset on right) is Infectious as a function of time.
We compare the true marginal derived by 105 independent Monte Carlo simulations
with that estimated by rDMP, the independent node approximation, and the pair
approximation. In the inset, we show the fraction f of Infectious nodes as a function
of time. On the right is the L1 error, averaged over all nodes; we see that rDMP is
the most accurate of the three methods. Here the transmission rate is = 0.1, the
waning rate is ⇢ = 0.05, and vertex 0 (colored red) was initially infected.

accurate, the points would fall on the line y = x. Both methods overestimate the
marginals to some extent, but rDMP is more accurate than the pair approximation
on every node. Thus rDMP makes accurate estimates of the marginals on individual
nodes, as opposed to just the average across the population.
To investigate how rDMP compares with the pair approximation across a broader
range of parameters, in Fig. 4.3 we vary the ratio between waning rate ⇢ and the
transmission rate . Since we can always rescale time by multiplying
same constant, we do this by holding

and ⇢ by the

= 0.1 as before, and varying ⇢. We then

measure the di↵erence in the L1 error of the two methods, LrDMP
- Lpair
1 .
1
In the blue region, rDMP is more accurate than the pair approximation; in the
red region, it is less so. We see that rDMP is more accurate except at early times
(as in Fig. 4.1) or when ⇢ is small compared to , i.e., if the model is close to the SI
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Figure 4.2: A scatterplot of the steady-state marginals Ii for the n = 33 nodes in
Zachary’s Karate Club, with the same parameters as in Fig. 4.1. The vertical axis
is the true marginal computed by Monte Carlo simulations; the horizontal axis is
the estimated marginals from rDMP (black ?) and the pair approximation (blue ⇥).
Both methods overestimate the marginal, but rDMP is closer to the true value (the
line y = x) for every node.

of the difference D(t, ) between LDMP
(t) and Lpair
(t) for increasing values of the p
1
1
model where Infectious nodes rarely become Susceptible again.
MP
(t) Lpair
(t)
in the Zachary’s network. A positive D(t, ) (colored red) means
1
an that from the pair-approximation, whereas DMP outperforms the pair-approxim
parameters as in Fig. 3, but we sweep through various value of the recovery rate .

ed in Eq. (9). So if D(t, ) is positive (negative), the error from r -DMP is mo
air-approximation. In Fig. 5, keeping all the parameters the same as in Fig.
r -DMP is only positive (colored red) at early times when is relatively low.
pare the performance in a single instance of an Erdős-Rényi graph (inset of th
single initially infectious node. Transmission
rate = 0.2, and recovery rate
rDMP
Figure 4.3: The di↵erence
and Lpair
on Zachary’s Karate Club for
3 between L1
1
ults were averaged
over
We see
that
does
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various values
of the10
ratio runs.
⇢/ . We rescale
time so
that r=-DMP
0.1 as before.
In the
bluebest, except
region, LrDMP
<outperforms
Lpair
and rDMP is more
accurate; in the red region, LrDMP
> Lpair
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r -DMP.
1
1 .
1
1
We see that rDMP is more accurate except at early times or when ⇢/ is small.
the performance
of all three methods in various other networks like random
metric graphs, scale-free networks, Newman-Watts-Strogatz small world netwo
of dolphins [21]. We find that r -DMP outperforms the first-moment-closure a
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FIG. 6. The fraction f of Infectious nodes as a function of time in
with n = 100 and average degree 3. Here = 0.4, ⇢ = 0.1, and the
node (colored red). Monte Carlo results were averaged over 103 in
racks the true trajectory more closely.
Figure 4.4: The fraction f of Infectious nodes as a function of time in the SIS model
on an Erdős-Rényi graph (inset) with n = 100 and average degree 3. Here = 0.4,
⇢ = 0.1, and the initial condition consists of a single Infectious node (colored red).
Monte Carlo results were averaged over 103 independent runs. Except at early times,
rDMP tracks the true trajectory more closely.

In Fig. 4.4, we simulate the SIS model on an Erdős-Rényi graph with n = 100
and average degree 3, with

= 0.4, ⇢ = 0.1, and a single initially Infectious node.

As with the Karate Club, rDMP does a better job of tracking the true fraction of
Infectious nodes, except at early times when the pair approximation is superior; in
particular, it does a better job of computing the steady-state size of the epidemic.
In Fig. 4.5 we show results for the SIRS model on Zachary’s Karate Club. As in
Fig. 4.1, on the left we show the marginal probability I29 that node 29 is Infectious;
on the right, we show the L1 error for Ii averaged over the network. In the insets,
we show the marginal probability R29 for the Recovered state and the corresponding
average L1 error. Here the transmission rate is

= 0.1, the waning rate from

Infectious to Recovered is ⇢ = 0.05, and the rate from Recovered to Susceptible is
= 0.2. The initial condition consisted of a single infected node, and Monte Carlo
results were averaged over 105 runs. As for the SIS model, rDMP is significantly
more accurate than the independent node approximation, and is more accurate than
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Figure 4.5: The SIRS model on the Karate Club. On the left, we show the true
and estimated marginal probability that a node 29 is Infectious (main figure) or
Recovered (inset) as a function of time. On the right is the average L1 error for the
Infectious and Marginal states. The transmission rate is = 0.1, and the transition
rates from Infectious to Recovered and from Recovered to Susceptible are ⇢ = 0.05
and = 0.2 respectively. Node 0 (colored red) was initially infected. Monte Carlo
results were averaged over 105 runs. As for the SIS model, rDMP is significantly
more accurate than the first-order model where nodes are independent, and is more
accurate than the pair approximation except at early times.

the pair approximation except at early times.

We found similar results on many other families of networks, including random regular graphs, random geometric graphs, scale-free networks, Newman-WattsStrogatz small world networks, and a social network of dolphins [59]. Namely, rDMP
outperforms the first-order approximation where nodes are independent, and outperforms the pair approximation across a wide range of parameters and times.
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Linear stability, epidemic thresholds,
and related work

Systems of di↵erential equations for rDMP, such as (4.2), do not appear to have a
closed analytic form due to their nonlinearities. On the other hand, we can compute
quantities such as epidemic thresholds by linearizing around a stationary point, such
as {I⇤j!i = 0} where the initial outbreak is small. Given a perturbation ✏j!i =
Ij!i - I⇤j!i , the linear stability of the system, i.e., whether or not ✏j!i diverges in

time, is governed by the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J of the right hand side
of (4.2) at the stationary point I⇤i . The Jacobian for (4.2) at {I⇤j!i } is
J(j!i),(k!j 0 ) = -

kj ij 0 ⇢

+ (1 - I⇤j )B(j!i),(k!j 0 ) .

(4.8)

ik ) .

(4.9)

where
B(j!i),(k!j 0 ) =

jj 0 (1

-

This definition of B is another way of saying that the edge k ! j influences edges
j ! i for i 6= k, but does not backtrack to k. This corresponds to our assumption
that infections, for instance, do not bounce from k to j and back again and create
an echo chamber e↵ect. For this reason, B is also known in the literature as the
non-backtracking matrix [65] or the Hashimoto matrix [61].
Now, for a small perturbation ~✏ away from a stationary point {I⇤j!i }, the linearized
system of (4.2) becomes
d~✏
= J~✏,
dt

(4.10)

If J has any eigenvalues with positive real part, then k~✏(t)k grows exponentially in
time. So, the fixed point {Ij!i } is stable as long as the leading eigenvalue J1 of J has
negative real part.
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One trivial, but important, stationary point to test is I⇤j!i = 0 for all edges. A
small perturbation around ~0 corresponds to a small initial probability that each node
is infected. From (4.8), J becomes
⇣
⇢ ⌘
J=
B- 1 ,

(4.11)

where 1 is the 2m ⇥ 2m identity matrix. So, the leading eigenvalue of J becomes
positive when the largest eigenvalue B1 of B is greater than ⇢/ . In other words, if
R0 =

⇢

B1 > 1 ,

(4.12)

where R0 is the reproductive number, even a small initial probability of infection will
lead to a widespread endemic state, where the infection becomes extensive. If (4.12)
does not hold, a small initial probability of infection will instead decay back to an
infection-less state.
Since B is not symmetric, not all its eigenvalues are real. However, by the PerronFrobenius theorem, it’s leading eigenvalue is real; moreover, it is upper bounded by
A1 , the leading eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix A. Interestingly, if we examine
the linear stability of the first-order approximation where nodes are independent,
[18], the epidemic threshold for the SIS model is given by
⇢

A1 > 1 .

(4.13)

Since B1 6 A1 , the threshold (4.12) gives a better upper bound for the true epidemic
threshold than we would get from the first-order approximation. A similar threshold
for the SIR model in sparse networks, or equivalently for percolation, using B1 was
recently demonstrated in [66]. (We note that when backtracking is allowed, it has
important consequences for epidemic thresholds on power-law networks [67].)
Whereas the leading eigenvector of B governs the epidemic threshold, the spectral
gap between B’s top two eigenvectors governs how quickly the epidemic converges to
the leading behavior (at least until we leave the linear regime). Qualitatively, this
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Figure 4.6: Same as in Fig. 4.1, but with transmission rate = 0.1 and waning rate
⇢ = 0.54. A well known upper bound on the epidemic threshold of the SIS model can
be computed from the leading eigenvalue A1 of the adjacency matrix (the Jacobian
matrix of first-moment-closure approach) of a network. In other words, if ⇢ < A1 , it
is known from the first-moment-method that an infection-free state becomes unstable
and epidemics become widespread and endemic. Here we show the results from SIS
model in Zachary’s Karate Club, where A1 ⇡ 6.7. Even though ⇢ = 5.4 < A1 which
is well below the threshold from the first-moment method, the contagion fades away
eventually, which is correctly captured by our DMP approach.

depends on bottlenecks in the network such as those due to community structure,
where an epidemic spreads quickly in one community but then takes a longer time
to cross over into another. Indeed, the second eigenvector of the non-backtracking
matrix B was recently used to detect community structure [65].
Similarly, just as the leading eigenvector of B was recently shown to be a good
measure of importance or “centrality” of a node [69], it may be helpful in identifying
“superspreaders”—nodes where an initial infection will generate the largest outbreak,
and be the most likely to lead to a widespread epidemic.

47

Chapter 5
Stability analysis of financial
contagion due to overlapping
portfolios
The work described in this chapter is a result of collaboration with Fabio Caccioli
(first-author), Cristopher Moore, J. Doyne Farmer and is published in Journal of
Banking & Finance Volume 46, (2014).

5.1

Introduction

The 2007–2009 financial crisis highlighted the complex interconnections between financial institutions and made it clear that we need a better understanding of how
financial contagion propagates and the circumstances under which it is amplified[80,
10, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87]. Financial contagion comes through di↵erent channels,
including (i) counterparty risk, (ii) roll-over risk, and (iii) common asset holdings,
i.e. overlapping portfolios. Of these the first two have so far received the most atten-
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tion, even though the primary problem is believed by many to have been due to the
third. Our goal in this chapter is to remedy this by gaining a better understanding
of the problem of overlapping portfolios. To do this we develop a method of computing the stability of financial networks under contagion due to overlapping portfolios.
To understand the factors that determine network stability, we develop and study a
stylized model, and suggest how it can be extended to be more realistic. This model
can be regarded as a multiple asset extension of the single asset model developed in
reference [88]1 .
Inter-institutional lending drives the problem of counterparty and roll-over risk.
Counterparty risk occurs when a bankrupt institution is unable to pay its debts and
consequently causes other institutions to fail [89]. Roll-over risk occurs when financial
institutions depend on short term lending for liquidity and their creditors stop lending
because they fail or are under stress, so that they are no longer able to borrow and
consequently fail or become under stress [83]. These have now been extensively
studied and we are rapidly developing better insight into the circumstances where
interbank lending causes problems (see for instance [80, 84, 89]).
Financial contagion due to overlapping portfolios is driven by common asset holdings [84, 90]. In the event that an asset price fluctuation causes an institution to fail,
the resulting “fire sale” of assets by that institution further depresses prices, which in
turn may cause other institutions to fail, causing a spiral of selling and further asset
price decreases. This also induces correlations between di↵erent assets that further
exacerbate the problem [91].
The problem of overlapping portfolios is very general. It occurs even without
inter-institutional lending, and applies to any institutions that manage money. Although this can occur even without leverage2 , the use of leverage makes it particularly
1

Reference [88] considered the properties of leveraged single asset portfolios. It was
shown that under deleveraging market impact can cause bankruptcy if leverage is too large.
2 In this chapter we assume that institutions sell assets only when they become

49

Chapter 5.

Stability analysis of financial contagion due to overlapping portfolios

acute. We are particularly interested in the banking system, where it is not uncommon for investments to be leveraged by a factor of 30 or more, but our analysis applies
equally well to hedge funds or any other financial institutions that make leveraged
investments. For convenience we will use the word bank to refer to institutions in
general, but the reader should bear in mind that our model applies equally well to
any leveraged financial institution.
The problem of overlapping portfolios has previously been considered in references
[80, 84, 92, 93]3 . In these papers, however, liquidation e↵ects were considered on top
of counterparty or roll-over risk. Here we are interested in the situation in which
shocks can propagate between di↵erent financial institutions through a pattern of
local portfolio overlaps (e.g. bank i has assets in common with bank j, that has
other assets in common with bank k, etc.). The model is simple: we assume that
banks own a portfolio of assets, that when a bank goes bankrupt due to a loss in the
value of its portfolio it sells its assets, and that this in turn causes these assets to be
devalued according to a simple market impact function relating the size of the sale
to the change in price.
The model we consider is purely mechanistic, i.e. we do not attempt to describe
decision-making processes by banks. The underlying assumption is that, during the
development of a crisis, banks do not have time to deleverage or rebalance their
portfolios before failing. Thus we consider portfolios fixed until default occurs, and
assume that they are fully liquidated when it occurs. We then perform a macroprudential stress test by applying localized shocks a↵ecting either a single bank or
a single asset. After the initial shock is applied we test to see whether it causes any
bankrupt, in which case the problem of financial contagion occurs only when leverage
is used. In general asset sales may be triggered by losses that are less severe, for example
if investment funds are forced to liquidate even when they are solvent, as occurred during
the stat-arb meltdown in 2007.
3 After completing these results we received reference [94], whose independent results
are complementary to ours.
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bank failures; if so we iterate the process as needed until either there are no more
failures or all banks have failed. The only trades during the course of the dynamics
are fire sales of the assets of insolvent banks.
Our focus in this chapter is therefore in understanding the specific role of market
impact and portfolio overlaps as a contagion mechanism between leveraged financial
institutions. To this end, we consider a network of banks and assets, and we test
how the average level of diversification in bank portfolios, the ratio of the number of
banks to the number of assets (crowding), and the leverage attained by banks impact
the stability of the system with respect to an initial shock a↵ecting a single asset or
bank.
The stability of the system will be measured in terms of the probability of observing a global cascade of failures, with a smaller probability being associated with
a higher stability. A global cascade of failures, in this context, refers to the failure of
a significant fraction of the banks: that is, a non-zero fraction in the limit of infinite
network size. By mapping our model onto a generalized branching process, we show
analytically that there is a region in parameter space where global cascades of failures occur. One advantage of this mechanistic approach is that it can in principle be
calibrated against real data and used to perform stress tests on real financial systems.
We find that, as the diversification of the banks’ portfolios increases, the system
undergoes two phase transitions, with a region in between where global cascades
occur. Below the first transition, banks are not interconnected enough for shocks
to propagate in the network. Above the second transition, banks are robust to
devaluations in a few of their assets. In between these two transitions, banks are
both vulnerable to shocks in their asset prices, and interconnected enough for these
shocks to spread. We also find that more leverage increases the overall instability
of the network and that the system exhibits a “robust yet fragile” behavior, with
regions of parameter space where contagion is rare but the whole system is brought
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down whenever it occurs.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the model.
In Section 5.3 we map the model into a generalized branching process and present the
analytical approach that allows us to identify the region of phase space where global
cascades occur. In Section 5.4 we report results from numerical simulations exploring
how stability of banking systems depends on parameters and network properties.
In section 5 we compare the results of numerical simulations to those of stability
analysis, and we present our conclusions in the last section.

5.2

The model

5.2.1

Banks, assets, and cascades of bankruptcies

We consider a representation of a financial system given in terms of a network of N
banks and M assets. Whenever a bank invests in an asset, we draw a link in the
network connecting that bank to that asset. The resulting network is bipartite (see
Figure 5.1), meaning that there are two groups of nodes (banks and assets) and that
there are links only between these two groups.
The number of assets in the portfolio of bank i, i.e. the number of links of the
corresponding node, is its degree ki . The average diversification, i.e. the average
degree of banks in the network, is then
N

1 X
µb =
ki ,
N i=1

(5.1)

where the sum runs over all N banks. Conversely, the number of banks that hold
asset j in their portfolio is its degree `j , and the average degree of the assets is
M

µa =

1 X
`j .
M j=1

(5.2)
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1

Although a complete description of the network’s topology would require more information, a rough characterization can be given in terms of two parameters, µb and
n = N/M. The crowding parameter n is a measure of the density of institutions
choosing their investments from the same pool of assets.
Each solvent bank i holds a portfolio {Qi,1 , . . . , Qi,M }. Its value at time t is
Ati =

M
X

Qij ptj ,

j=1

where Qij is the number of shares of asset j held by bank i and ptj the price of asset
j at time t. In our dynamics a bank holds on its portfolio as long as it is solvent, so
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Qij is independent of time. Notice that, given that bank i invests in ki assets, only
ki of the M portfolio weights Qij will be non-zero for bank i.
Each solvent bank also holds cash Ci , and we denote by Li its total liabilities;
neither of these quantities depend on time. If A0i is the initial value of bank i’s
portfolio, its initial equity (or capital) is therefore E0i = A0i + Ci - Li . The leverage
of a bank is the ratio between the amount of risky assets on its balance sheet and its
equity. Assuming no risk associated with cash holdings, the initial leverage of bank
i is

i

= A0i /E0i .

The condition for bank i to be solvent at time t is
M
X

Qij ptj + Ci > Li .

(5.4)

j=1

Given that E0i = A0i + Ci - Li , the above condition can be expressed as
A0i -

M
X

Qij ptj 6 E0i .

(5.5)

j=1

The left hand side represents the loss with respect to the initial investment. If such
a loss happens to be greater than the initial capital of the bank, the bank is out of
business.
Note that leverage is a necessary condition for banks to fail. A bank investing
only its own capital always satisfies condition (5.5), since its maximal loss is equal
to its equity. We can write (5.5) as a condition on the leverage,
PM
t
j=1 Qij pj
+ 1.
i 6
E0i

(5.6)

Even in the worst case scenario where ptj = 0 for all assets, this condition can be
violated only if

i

> 1, i.e. if the bank is leveraged.

Whenever a bank does not satisfy the solvency condition (5.5), we assume its
portfolio undergoes a fire sale, i.e. all its assets are immediately liquidated. The fire
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sale causes the price of the assets in the bank’s portfolio to drop. If xj is the fraction
of asset j that has been liquidated, the price is updated as
pj ! pj fj (xj )

(5.7)

We are interested in the response of the system to an initial shock. We consider
two kinds of initial shocks:
• Presence of a toxic asset. We select a random asset j and devalue it at time
0.
• Initial failure of a bank. We select a random bank i and cause it to go
bankrupt.
In each case we follow the chain of events caused by the initial shock. The dynamics
we consider is very simple: after shocking the system at time t = 0, at each time
step t = 1, 2, . . . the solvency condition (5.5) is checked for each bank, the portfolios
of newly insolvent (bankrupted) banks are liquidated, and new prices are computed
for each asset. The dynamics stops when no new bankruptcies occur between two
consecutive time steps. This can be expressed with the following algorithm:
1. introduce the initial shock in the system;
2. liquidate the portfolio of insolvent banks;
3. recompute prices of assets;
4. if new banks are insolvent go to step 2, otherwise end.
Note that we don’t allow for new banks to enter the system, so that once a bank has
gone bankrupt it remains in this state for the rest of the process.
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In the limit of large systems, when N, M ! 1 while the parameters µb and

n = N/M remain finite, the initial shock we consider only a↵ects an infinitesimal (of

order O(1/N)) fraction of the banking system. We are interested in understanding

if and when such infinitesimal shocks can trigger global cascades of failures. A global
cascade of failures is defined as a cascade a↵ecting a finite fraction of banks in the
infinite system. In the following we will measure the probability and the average
extent of contagion. We define the probability of contagion as the probability that a
global cascade of failures occurs, and the average extent of contagion as the average
size of a global cascade.

5.3

Stability analysis

In this section we develop a theoretical approach that allows us to compute a bound
on stability, which as we will show is a good estimate, for when cascading bank
failures are likely to occur. We show how this can be applied to understand the
stability of specific banking networks (i.e. a given set of banks and their balance
sheets), and we also show how it can be used to understand how stability depends
on the parameters of the network, such as diversification, crowding, and leverage.
Let us start by discussing what happens if there is an external shock that causes
a particular bank to go bankrupt. Through the combination of leverage and impact,
this failure can trigger the failure of other banks investing in the same assets. If the
parameters of the system amplify shocks, this can generate a cascading failure that
propagates through the system. One of our main points is that, while the likelihood
of the first bank failure depends on the nature of the shocks, whether or not this
propagates depends on whether the financial system is stable, which in turn depends
on parameters such as the leverage, market impact and network structure. We begin
with a general discussion of branching processes. We then discuss how it can be
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applied to understand a given banking network, and make some specific assumptions
that allow us to demonstrate how the stability of the banking system depends on
parameters.

5.3.1

The Galton-Watson process

The scenario of cascading failures for banks closely resembles the branching process
introduced by Galton and Watson to study the survival probability of family names
over generations [95]. This process is formulated in terms of a progenitor that gives
rise to x children, where x is a non-negative integer drawn from a probability distribution g(x). Each of the children, in turn, independently generates a number of
o↵spring distributed according to g(x), and the same process is repeated at each
generation. The question is whether such a process is doomed to extinction or not,
i.e. if the population drops to zero after a finite number of generations, so that the
total number of descendants is finite. A fundamental result in the theory of branching processes states that such a process goes extinct with probability one if E[x] < 1,
where E[x] is the expected number of o↵spring per individual.
For our purposes it is essential to consider a generalized Galton-Watson process
with individuals of di↵erent types i 2 1, 2, . . . , q. The key quantities are then,
for each pair of types i, j, the expected number of o↵spring of type i produced by
an individual of type j. We denote these as a q ⇥ q matrix Nij . The condition
for extinction is then that the largest eigenvalue ⇠1 of N is smaller than one [96].
Conversely, if this eigenvalue is greater than one, then with positive probability
this process lasts forever, producing an infinite number of o↵spring. We say that
the branching process is subcritical or supercritical if this eigenvalue is less than or
greater than one, respectively.
In the context of our model, we are interested in computing the expected number
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of banks that go bankrupt because of the previous failure of another bank. Consider
for example the case in which a random bank i receives a shock at time t = 0
that causes it to become bankrupt. This bank is equivalent to the progenitor of
the Galton-Watson process, and banks whose bankruptcy is triggered by that of i
are equivalent to its o↵spring. In the language of branching processes, banks failing
at time t correspond to individuals in the t-th generation. We are interested in
understanding when there is a non-zero chance that financial contagion keeps on
spreading over time, which is equivalent to asking whether shocks will be amplified
rather than dying out. If the branching process is supercritical, then this initial shock
results in a global cascade with non-zero probability, a↵ecting a non-zero fraction of
all the banks in the limit of infinite system size.
Note that in our model we have in principle banks with di↵erent properties (degree, leverage, size. . . ) that can be considered as individuals of di↵erent types in the
generalized Galton-Watson process. Thus Nhk is the expected number of banks of
type h that fail because of the failure of a bank of type k. There is obviously considerable flexibility in how we classify banks into types, which at its most fine-grained
extreme allows the “types” to correspond to individual banks.
It is important to stress at this point that the process here considered is more
complex than the usual generalized Galton-Watson process. In particular, in our
case, the ultimate fate of bank i depends not only on its properties, but also on
those of all the other banks whose portfolio overlaps with i. This happens because
the price drop that follows the fire sale liquidation of an asset depends on the fraction
of total shares of that asset being liquidated, which changes from bank to bank.
A second important di↵erence is that the Galton-Watson process occurs on a
tree, so that individuals of a given generation are independent. For banks the failure
process is not necessarily a tree, but is rather a more general graph which may have
loops. To see this, consider a simple example of three banks i, j, and k with one
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asset in common. Let us suppose that i is robust with respect to the failure of
j by itself, but not with respect to the failure of both j and k together. Now, if
the failure of j is enough to trigger that of k, then i is e↵ectively vulnerable to the
failure of j. Such situations, which occur whenever assets have degree higher than
2, are neglected under the analytical calculation that we perform here. Therefore,
our analytical treatment gives a sufficient but not a necessary condition for global
cascades to occur, and gives only an upper bound on the stability of the banking
system. We will see, however, that it is nonetheless a good approximation, in rough
agreement with the results of numerical simulations.
It is in principle possible to improve this approximation to account for the nonlinearities induced by loops in the branching process by considering multiple timestep dynamics. This method is commonly used in dynamical system theory: the t-th
iteration of the dynamics converts cycles of length t into fixed points. For instance,
to properly treat triplets one can compute a two-step matrix that counts the average
number of banks of type i whose failure is triggered by the bankruptcy of a bank of
type j within two time steps of the dynamics. Comparing to the example given above,
if an initial shock causes j to fail, k will fail after one iteration, and since both j and k
have now failed, i will fail in the second time step. While our one-step approximation
is already quite accurate, this approach provides a path for systematically improving
the degree of approximation, which deserves further investigation.

5.3.2

Stability of a given system

If we have complete information about the banking system, i.e. if we know the
portfolios Qba of all the banks and, in addition, the market impact function for their
assets, then we can describe the stability of the system through a matrix B, where
Bij is the probability that bank i will fail under the failure of bank j. Bank i becomes
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insolvent when bank j fails if and only if the market impact due to the sale of their
overlapping assets causes a loss to bank i that exceeds its equity Ei . As described
above, we focus for now on the direct e↵ect on bank i of the failure of bank j. Since
we assume that bank j’s entire portfolio {Qja } is liquidated, the new price for asset
a is pa (1 - fa (Qja )). Using the shorthand Prob(x) to indicate the probability that
condition x is satisfied, the stability matrix Bij is defined as
"M
#
X
Bij = Prob
Qia pa (1 - fa (Qja )) - Ei > 0 .

(5.8)

a=1

In order to understand whether a cascade of failures will spread, we compute Bij in
the case where the assets shared by banks i and j have not yet been devalued, and still
have their initial prices. That is, we focus on the “boundary” of the cascade, with
failures and devaluations spreading outward through the network through banks and
assets that have not yet been touched by the crisis. In that case, since the dynamics
themselves are deterministic, Bij depends only on the initial structure of the banks’
portfolios, and in particular on the network structure. The stability of the banking
system can then be estimated by simply computing the largest eigenvalue ⇠1 of B
and determining whether ⇠1 is greater than or less than one.
Note that, rather than using the simplifying approximation that the market impact function is deterministic, one could more realistically use a stochastic market
impact function as in [88]. Similarly, imperfect knowledge about bank portfolios
and equity can be coped with using probabilities to represent uncertainties in their
values. In either case, we can still bound the stability of the network by computing
B’s largest eigenvalue.

5.3.3

Simplifying assumptions

The approach described above makes it possible to estimate the stability of the
banking system when it is in a particular state, corresponding to a particular config-

60

Chapter 5.

Stability analysis of financial contagion due to overlapping portfolios

uration of the balance sheets of each bank. One of our main goals here, however, is
to understand more generically how the stability of the banking system depends on
its network properties. To make a high-level characterization it is necessary to think
in terms of ensembles of networks, and to understand how stability varies as properties of the ensemble are varied. As a first step in this direction we will make some
specific assumptions in order to simplify the problem and gain intuition. While these
assumptions are rather arbitrary, the basic method used here is easily generalized,
as discussed later.
• Network topology: We will consider random networks with Poisson degree
distributions for both banks and assets. Specifically, for each possible bankasset pair a link is drawn with probability µb /M. The resulting network is
drawn from the bipartite Erdős-Renyi ensemble of random networks with average degrees µb and µa = µb N/M for the banks and assets respectively.
• Structure of balance sheets: We will assume all banks have the same
amount of money A0i = A0 available for investment, and that each bank uni-

formly splits its investment in the assets that are in its portfolio. The asset
side of bank’s balance sheets will be composed of 80% assets and 20% cash.
For bank i each link thus corresponds to an investment of 0.8A0 /ki , where ki
is the number of assets in i’s portfolio. Unless otherwise stated, we assume for
each bank an initial equity E0i = E0 corresponding to 4% of its total assets.
This corresponds to all banks having initial leverage

= A0 /E0 = 20.

• Market impact function: We will assume that the market impact function
t

has the form fj (xtj ) = e-↵xj , where xtj is the fraction of asset j liquidated up
to time t. The parameter ↵ is chosen such that the price drops by 10% when
10% of the asset is liquidated, i.e. ↵ = 1.0536. All prices are set to p0j = 1
at time 0. This choice corresponds to linear market impact for log-prices,
as originally used to describe price dynamics in [97, 98]. It should be noted
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that recent empirical and theoretical evidence indicates that market impact for
large trades is a concave function of the number of traded shares, which under
normal conditions impact is well approximated by a square-root function [99].
By normal conditions we mean that execution is slow enough for the order
book to replenish between successive trades. Under extreme conditions, like
those of a fire sale, market impact is expected to become less concave and even
linear or super-linear [100], which motivates our choice of functional form here.
Altering these assumptions does not change the qualitative behavior of the system. In particular, our methods generalize easily to degree distributions other than
Poisson, e.g. power laws, and also to multiple types of banks with di↵erent sizes, portfolio structures, and amounts of leverage, or multiple types of assets with di↵erent
initial prices and market impact functions.

5.3.4

Explicit calculation of the stability matrix

In order to understand how stability depends on network properties, we lump banks
into equivalence classes according to their degree, equating their degree with their
type in the generalized Galton-Watson process. We define the following notation:
• Nh is the number of banks of degree h.
• P(h, k|a) is the probability that a given bank of degree h and a given bank of
degree k share a given asset a, i.e., are both connected to a in the network.
• F(h|k, a) is the probability that a bank of degree h fails given that it is connected to a failed bank of degree k through asset a.
Under the assumption that we are in the limit where M ! 1, N ! 1 while µb

and n = N/M are finite, the network is sparse, and we can easily compute the
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probability Bij by summing over each asset one at a time. If i has degree h and j
has degree k, the probability that the failure of bank j causes bank i to fail can be
written
Bij =

X

P(h, k|a) F(h|k, a) .

(5.9)

a

Summing over all banks of degree h, the expected number of failures of banks of
degree h caused by the failure of a bank of degree k, is
Nhk = Nh

M
X

P(h, k|a)F(h|k, a) .

(5.10)

a=1

This is the matrix defining the branching process, i.e. the expected number of o↵spring of type h from an individual of type k.
We can now compute each of the entires of Nhk in turn. Since the degree distribution of our network ensemble is Poisson, the number of banks of degree h is simply
Nh = NPb (h) where
Pb (h) =

e-µb µh
b
h!

(5.11)

is the probability that a bank has degree h. A given bank of degree h is connected to
a given asset a with degree `a with probability h`a /(µb N), where µb N is the total
number of edges in the network. The probability that a failed bank of degree k is
also connected to the same asset a is h(k - 1)`a (`a - 1)/(µb N)2 , where the factor
of k - 1 comes from the fact that one of the k edges of the failed bank is already
connected to the asset that caused its failure. This gives
P(h, k|a) =

h`a (k - 1)(`a - 1)
.
µ2b N

(5.12)

We now compute the probability F(h|k, a) that a bank i of degree h fails due to
failure of a bank j of degree k given that they share an asset a. The shift in price
when a fraction xa of an asset is sold is (1 - fa (xa )). (Recall that the initial price is
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set to one for convenience). Thus the condition for a bank of degree k to fail because
bank j sells a fraction xa of asset a is
A0
(1 - fa (xa )) > E0 .
k

(5.13)

If ⌫(a) denotes the set of banks investing in asset a, the fraction of a that is liquidated
when j fails is
xa = P

A0 /k
1/k
1/k
P
P
=
=
, (5.14)
0
1/h + 1/k + m2⌫ 0 (a) 1/km
m2⌫(a) A /km
m2⌫(a) 1/km

where ⌫ 0 (a) denotes the set of banks, other than i and j, that invest in a and km
the degree of bank m.

To compute F(h|k, a) we must add up the probability of failure for each possible
configuration of banks that are compatible with the condition of choosing a specific
pair of banks of degrees h and k that are connected through asset a. If a has
degree `a , there are `a - 2 remaining banks. Letting i index these banks, we must
average over the possible configurations {m1 , . . . , m`a -2 }. Fortunately the degrees of
the banks are independent. The probability that bank i has degree mi is the ratio of
the number of edges for banks of degree m to the total number of edges. Since Nm =
NPb (m), the number of edges for banks of degree m is mNm , and the total number
of edges in the network is µb N. Thus each bank has degree m with probability
mNm /(µb N) = mPb (m)/µb and the probability of any given configuration of bank
degrees is
`Y
a -2
i=1

mi Pb (mi )
.
µb

(5.15)

Combining equations (13 - 15) and summing over all the possible configurations
{m1 , . . . , m`a -2 } gives
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F(h|k, a) =

1
X

m1 =1

···

1
X

`Y
a -2

m(`a -2) =1 i=1

"

A0
⇥⇥
h

mi Pb (mi )
µb

1 - fa

1/k
P a -2
1/h + 1/k + `i=1
1/mi

(5.16)
!!

-E

0

#

,

(5.17)

where ⇥ is the Heaviside step function, ⇥(x) = 1 if x > 0 and zero otherwise.
After summing over assets equation (5.10) becomes

Nhk =

X e-µa µ`
e-µb µh
a
b h(k - 1)
`(` - 1)F(h, k, `),
h!
µ2b n
`!
`

(5.18)

where we have used the fact that the number of assets with given degree ` is MPa (`)
and explicitly introduced the Poisson degree distributions of banks and assets.
The form of the matrix N confirms that the independent parameters of the model
are µb , n,

and ↵. We can see in particular that, although leverage has a similar

e↵ect on stability to the market impact constant ↵, the two are not related through
a simple relation that allows us to eliminate one of the two dependencies. However,
if we had used a market impact that was linear in the price, instead of the log-price,
i.e. of the form fa (x) = ↵ 0 x, then the stability would depend only on the product
↵ 0 and not on the two parameters separately.
For networks in which all the banks have the same degree k we can compute the
largest eigenvalue of N in closed form. In this case the matrix N reduces to the scalar
quantity
N = ⇠1 = (k - 1)µb n

(l⇤ - 1, µb n)
,
(l⇤ - 1)

(5.19)

where
l⇤ =

1
log

,

(5.20)

-k
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(x) is the gamma function, and (x, z) is the incomplete Gamma function.
If we make the approximation

1
kb

!E

⇥1⇤
k

we can obtain a closed expression for

Nh,k . However, given that this approximation is uncontrolled, we do not give an explicit form for the matrix elements, but rather compute them exactly via Montecarlo
methods.

5.4

Dependence on leverage and network properties

We now explore how the stability of the banking network depends on parameters.
We first show results based on numerical simulations and then compare them to
results based on the stability matrix N.
In numerical simulations N and M are both finite, and global cascades can be
defined as cascades for which the fraction of bankrupted banks exceeds a fixed threshold. For consistency with previous work on counterparty loss [80, 101, 102], we set
this threshold to 5%. The contagion probability is then measured as the fraction
of runs in which a global cascade results from the initial shock. The conditional
average extent of contagion is the fraction of failed banks, averaged only over those
runs where a global cascade occurs.

5.4.1

E↵ect of diversification and crowding

We begin with the case where the initial shock consists of devaluing a random asset.,
and examine the dependence on diversification and crowding. In the left panel of
Figure 5.2, we plot the probability and conditional extent of contagion measured
for a system of N = 104 banks and M = 104 assets as a function of the average
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Figure 5.2: Left panel: contagion probability (blue dots, the solid line is a guide for the
eye) and conditional extent of contagion (red squares) measured from 1000 simulations of
a system with N = M = 104 . In each run, the initial shock consists of dropping the price
of a random asset by 35% at the beginning of the simulation. We vary the average degree
of diversification µb = µa . The two vertical dashed lines mark our numerical estimates
for the critical values µ1 and µ2 where phase transitions occur, and show the existence of
a contagion window between these transitions where global cascades occur with non-zero
probability. The system also displays a “robust yet fragile” behavior for µb slightly below
µ2 : the probability of a global cascade is small, but when one occurs it a↵ects almost all
the banks. Right panel: contagion probability for systems with N = 104 and M = 5 ⇥ 103
(red squares), M = 104 (green diamonds) and M = 2 ⇥ 104 (black stars) as a function of
the average banks’ degree. Solid lines are a guide for the eye. The boundaries µ1 , µ2 of the
contagion window depend on the value of the crowding parameter n = N/M: for larger n
both phase transitions are shifted to the left.

banks’ degree µb . Results refer to 1000 runs in which a random asset is initially
devalued by 35%. We observe phase transitions at two critical values µ1 , µ2 of µb ,
with a contagion window in between where global cascades of failures occur with
non-zero probability. Above and below this window, where µb > µ2 or µb < µ1 ,
global cascades do not occur.
The existence of a contagion window, and the nonmonotonicity of the contagion
probability as a function of µb , can be understood with the following arguments.
On one hand, for sufficiently low values of µb , stress cannot propagate through the
system because the network is poorly connected; there is not enough overlap between
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the banks’ portfolios to spread the cascade. In particular, for small enough µb the
network of banks and assets consists of small components disconnected from one
another, so even if every bank is extremely vulnerable to collapse, an initial shock
will only a↵ect one of these components. Thus there is a critical µ1 below which the
cascade cannot propagate; the initial shock might a↵ect a few nearby banks, but the
cascade quickly dies out.
On the other hand, if the banks’ portfolios are sufficiently diverse, they are robust
with respect to devaluing any single asset in their portfolio. Moreover, a larger average bank degree µb also implies a larger average asset degree µa , so each institution
typically holds a smaller fraction of the shares of any given asset. As a consequence,
each bank failure has a relatively small e↵ect on asset prices, and most banks remain
solvent even if some of their assets are devalued. Thus there is a critical µ2 above
which cascades quickly die out even though the network is highly connected.
The left panel of Figure 5.2 also shows that the system displays a “robust yet
fragile” behavior [80] for some values of the parameters. Specifically, if µb is slightly
less than µ2 , just inside the upper end of the contagion window, the probability of a
global cascade is very small, tending continuously to zero as µb approaches µ2 from
below. But when a global cascade does occur, it a↵ects almost all the banks: the
conditional extent of the contagion is almost 1.
In the right panel of Figure 5.2 we plot the contagion probability for di↵erent
values of the crowding parameter n = N/M. As n increases, the contagion window
shifts to the left, decreasing both µ1 and µ2 .
The shift in µ1 can be understood in terms of the appearance of a giant connected
component in the network. In the ensemble of random networks considered here, the
emergence of the giant component corresponds to the situation where the average
number of banks to which a given bank b is exposed, i.e. the average number of
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banks whose portfolios share at least one asset with b, is one. Equivalently, this is
the average degree of the projected network where two banks are connected if they
share an asset. For this ensemble (essentially the bipartite version of the Erdős-Rényi
p
model) this degree is µa µb = µ2b n, giving µ1 = 1/ n.
To explain the shift in the second transition point µ2 , we note that the drop in
price of an asset caused by the liquidation of a portfolio is a decreasing function of n.
This is because the average number of banks investing in a given asset is µa = µb n.
If each bank owns a smaller fraction of an asset, the market impact of a fire sale on
that asset is smaller. When n is larger, this e↵ect takes over at a smaller value of
µb .
Note that, as a result, changing the crowding parameter n has di↵erent e↵ects on
the network’s stability depending on the value of µb . If µb is close to µ1 , increasing
n while keeping µb fixed increases the instability of the system, moving it into the
contagion window by increasing the connectivity of the network. The opposite is
true if µb is close to µ2 , where increasing n moves us outside the contagion window
by making assets and banks more robust. Thus the contagion probability is not a
monotonic function of n.

5.4.2

Dependence on shocks

The above simulations started with an initial shock consisting of devaluing a random
asset. We now consider the case where we begin with the failure of a random bank.
Figure 5.3 shows a comparison between simulations with shocks of these two types.
We observe that the probability of contagion depends on the type of shock, but the
contagion window and the conditional extent of contagion are the same for both types
of shock. The reason is simple: while the initial conditions of these two processes are
di↵erent, their dynamics are the same. Once a cascade has begun, it doesn’t matter
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Figure 5.3: The probability of contagion, and the average conditional extent of contagion,
as a function of µb for the two types of initial shock (failed asset vs. failed bank). Red
squares: contagion probability where a random asset is devalued by 35%. Blue dots:
the contagion probability when a random bank fails. Blue circles and green triangles:
conditional extent of contagion for asset shocks and bank shocks respectively. We see that
while the probability of contagion di↵ers between the two types of shocks, the window
µ1 < µb < µ2 in which they occur with non-zero probability is the same. Moreover, when
a global cascade does occur, its average size is the same for both types of shocks. Results
refer to 1000 simulations of systems with N = M = 104 .

what kind of shock began it. Thus the region where the dynamics cause a cascade
to spread rather than die out is the same in both cases, as is the eventual size of a
global cascade if one occurs.

5.4.3

Leverage

We now show what happens for di↵erent values of initial leverage. In the left panel
of Figure 5.4 we plot the contagion probability for di↵erent values of µb as a function
of . We observe that, for each µb , there is a critical value of
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Figure 5.4: Left panel: Contagion probability as a function of leverage measured from
1000 simulations of a system with N = 10000 for di↵erent values of µb .The initial shock
considered is the initial failure of a random bank. Contagion probability is a monotonic
function of leverage, and a phase transition separates a regime where no global cascades are
observed from one where they occur with non-zero probability. Right panel: Contagion
probability as a function of the market impact parameter ↵. Increasing market impact has
a similar e↵ect as increasing leverage.

cascades occur with non-zero probability, and below which they do not. This is of
interest for regulatory purposes, since it implies the existence of a critical level of
leverage below which systemic stability is guaranteed. In addition, the critical value
of

increases as µb increases: in other words, increasing diversification allows for a

greater degree of leverage without creating systemic events.
In the right panel of Figure 5.4, we show that a similar behavior occurs as we
change the parameter ↵ that appears in the market impact function while keeping
the leverage fixed. That is, for a given value of µb and , there is a critical value of ↵
above which contagion occurs. This is not unexpected, since under the assumptions
specified in Section 5.3.3 the solvency condition for bank i can be written as
PM
-↵xtj
j=1 Qij e
+ 1,
(5.21)
i 6
E0i
where xtj is the fraction of shares of asset j liquidated up to time t. When ↵ is larger,
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the market impact of a fire sale is greater, causing a sharper drop in asset prices.
On the other hand, increasing diversification µb increases this critical value of ↵,
showing that diversification allows banks to survive a larger price impact.
Summarizing, we presented in this section results of numerical simulations for
bipartite networks with Poisson degree distributions for both banks and assets. The
probability and the average extent of contagion have been measured for two di↵erent
types of shocks, namely the initial depreciation of a random asset or the initial failure
of a random bank. Our simulations suggest that:

• As a function of the average diversification of banks’ portfolios, represented by
their average degree µb , the system is characterized by two phase transitions
that define a contagion window where global cascades occurs with non-zero
probability.
• Changing the crowding parameter n, i.e. the ratio of the number of banks
to the number of assets available for investment, can increase or decrease the
contagion probability depending on which of these transitions we are close to.
• Although the contagion probability is di↵erent for the two types of initial
shocks, the contagion window within which global cascades occur, and the
average extent of these cascades when they occur, are the same.
• The system displays a “robust yet fragile” behavior, with regions in parameter
space where global cascades are very unlikely, but where almost the entire
system is a↵ected if one occurs.
• For each fixed µb and n, there is a critical value of the leverage
the system becomes unstable. This critical value of
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Comparison to predictions from stability anal-
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Figure 5.5:

Contagion probability (green dots, right axis) as computed from numerical
simulations of a system of size N = M = 104 . The red solid line (left axis) represent the
largest eigenvalue ⇠1 of the matrix N. The dashed horizontal line is in correspondence
to ⇠1 = 1. If ⇠1 > 1 global cascades are observed in numerical simulations. The theory
underestimates the width of the contagion window, as it only gives a sufficient condition for
global cascades to occur. However, the discrepancy between theory and numerical results
is partly due to finite size e↵ects (see Figure 5.6).

We now compare the numerical results presented in the previous section to those
based on stability analysis. The stability analysis depends on two assumptions that
are not necessarily well-satisfied in the simulation. The first is that M and N are
both infinite (even though their ratio n = N/M is finite), and the second is that the
failure process can be described through a branching process on a tree.
We estimated F(h, k, `) through monte-carlo methods and assumed that the contribution coming from banks with degree higher than 200 is negligible. We then
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Figure 5.6:

Simulation results for N = 100 ( blue circles), N = 1000 (red squares),
N = 20000 (green triangles), n = 1. The vertical dashed lines are drawn in correspondence
to the phase transitions predicted by the analytic calculation. As the size of the system
increases the agreement between theory and simulations improves. Finite size e↵ects are
expected given that the theory is valid in the limit {N, M} ! 1.

numerically diagonalized the 200 by 200 matrix N. We discuss in the following the
results obtained in the case where Pa (`) and Pb (h) are Poisson distributions.
In Figure 5.5 we plot for n = 1 the largest eigenvalue of N and we compare it with
the contagion probability as computed from numerical simulations. As expected,
when the largest eigenvalue of N is greater than 1 global cascades are observed.
We see from the figure that the analytic calculation underestimates the size of the
contagion window. This is partly due to finite size e↵ects, as observed for instance in
[103]. We plot in Figure 5.6 the contagion probability as measured from numerical
simulations for n = 1 and di↵erent values of N. From the figure we clearly see that
by increasing the size of the system the discrepancy between analytic and numerical
calculations gets smaller, and that the analytic solution, although giving only a
sufficient condition for global cascades to occur, produces a reasonable estimate of
the contagion window when N and M are large.
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Figure 5.7: Left panel: The red region is the region of phase space where global cascades
occur for a system with = 20 as a function of µb and n. Right panel: the red region is
the region of phase space where global cascades occur for a system with n = 1 as a function
of µb and . Points refer to the phase transition as measured from the largest eigenvalue
of N. Lines are a guide for the eye.

We finally plot in Figure 5.7 the phase diagram obtained with our analytic approach. The region within the solid line in the left panel represent the region where
global cascades occur for

= 20. From the figure we can see the features already

observed in numerical simulations. In particular, for fixed n, we clearly see the existence of two phase transitions that define a window of connectivities where global
cascades occur with non-zero probability. As we change n, the analytic calculation
also predicts the shift in the transition points, that tend to move to higher values of
µb as n is decreased. In the right panel of Figure 5.7, we depict the phase diagram
for n = 1 as a function of leverage

and average diversification µb . As expected,

we see that the contagion window widens as

increases. A three dimensional visual-

ization of the phase diagram is reported in Figure 5.8, where the red region denotes
the unstable region of parameter space. Interestingly, we observe the existence of a
minimum level of leverage ( ' 12) that leads to the occurrence of global cascades
of failure. This feature is of potential interest for regulators, since it is equivalent
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Figure 5.8: 3D visualization of the region of parameter space where global cascades occur
with non-zero probability as predicted with the analytical approach. Global cascades are
observed within the cone-shaped colored region. We note in particular that there is critical
value of leverage below which global cascades do not occur for any values of diversification
and crowding parameter.

to the existence of a maximum level of leverage below which the system is overall
stable.
Another point of potential interest for regulators is the eigenvalue of the matrix
N. In a dynamic setting in which banks operate under no stress circumstances,
one expects ⇠1 to change over time as banks trade to rebalance their portfolios.
By monitoring the time behavior of ⇠1 , a regulator would notice if the system is
approaching a dangerous regime as ⇠1 gets closer to 1, and could act to increase the
stability of the system.
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Chapter 6
Concluding remarks and future
work
In this thesis, we first consider in chapter 3 the dynamic message-passing (DMP)
technique to study a simple threshold model of behavior in networks. In doing so,
we are able capture how each individual’s probability of becoming an adopter evolves
in time in an arbitrary network with far less computational cost than Monte Carlo
simulations. Although DMP is exact only on trees, we observe that it compares
well with simulations even in a real social network where there are many loops.
Interestingly, unlike in the SIR model, or equivalently the case T = 1, there are cases
where DMP can either underestimate or overestimate the probability of infection.
In addition, we apply DMP equations to give analytical results in the thermodynamic limit of large random networks. We provide an exact analytic result for
calculating the time dependence of the probabilities, thereby learning something
about the dynamics of bootstrap percolation.
The message-passing dynamics we consider here can be generalized in many
ways, including letting the transmission probability and the threshold vary arbi-
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trarily across edges and vertices. Because the transmission rate r(⌧) may depend on
the elapsed time ⌧ since an individual became an adopter, our study can be implemented in networks where some non-Markovian assumptions are warranted, as we
pointed out in Section 3.1.
We can include so-called “rumor spreading” models where, rather than setting
r(⌧) = 0 until an individual’s awareness reaches a threshold as we have done here, an
individual starts telling its neighbors about the rumor even if it has only heard about
it once. Such models were recently applied to the di↵usion of microfinance [41]. We
can also let the rate at which an individual receives new information depend on its
own awareness. An interesting case is to consider a unimodal function.
We can also consider a model where j can transmit repeatedly to i, raising i’s
awareness each time. We simply replace each directed edge (j, i) with T multi-edges.
So, each message Ui

j (t)

would now be mapped to T identical copies of itself. The

update equations and expressions are the same as above, but now we sum over all
these multi-edges accordingly.
In Section 3.3, we focus on random networks in the configuration model. However, DMP equations can be easily generalized to many other families of random
graphs, including interdependent networks [40], scale-free networks [54], small-world
networks [33, 32], and bipartite networks [11] to name a few. In some cases this is a
matter of plugging in a di↵erent degree distribution, and allowing for a finite number
of types of vertices. However, for preferential attachment networks the topology is
correlated with the vertices’ ages, so we would have to let the messages U(t) depend
on the age of the vertices sending them.
We can also extend this study to a network that has community structures such
as the stochastic block model. We can then study how trends move through communities, and how the distribution of initial adopters (for instance, whether they are
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concentrated in one community, or are spread across many communities) a↵ects the
eventual fraction of the network that adopts the trend. Community structures can
be driven by socio-economic, ethnic, religious and linguistic separations. So, it would
be useful to gain some perspective on how the structures of communities contribute
to the norms and social preferences that prevail in real populations, and in turn how
di↵erences in these norms drive the division of social networks into communities.
However, DMP has been exclusively applied to non-recurrent models, where the
states of the nodes evolve in one-way or irreversibly. Modern epidemiological studies
often require recurrent models, where nodes can return to their previous inhabited
states multiple times. For example, consider diseases such as influenza where individuals are infected multiple times throughout their lives, or whooping cough where
vaccine e↵ectiveness wanes over time; in both cases, individuals return to the Susceptible class.
In chapter 4, we extend DMP to recurrent epidemic models which we call rDMP.
Our rDMP approach defines messages on the directed edges of a network in such
a way as to prevent signals, such as the spread of infection, from backtracking immediately to the node that they came from. By preventing these “echo chamber
e↵ects,” rDMP obtains good estimates of the time-varying marginal probabilities on
a wide variety of networks, estimating both the fraction of infectious individuals in
the entire network, and the probabilities that individual nodes become infected.
Like the pair approximation, rDMP takes correlations between neighboring nodes
into account. However, our experiments show that rDMP is more accurate than
the pair approximation for a wide variety of network structures and parameters.
Moreover, rDMP is computationally less expensive than the pair approximation,
especially for complex epidemic models with a large number of states, using O(mk)
instead of O(mk2 ) variables for models with k states on networks with m edges.
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Finally, rDMP is conceptually simple, allowing the user to immediately write
down the system of di↵erential equations for a wide variety of epidemic models, such
as those with multiple stages of infection or immunity [72, 73], or those with multiple
interacting diseases [74, 75]. We expect that given its simplicity and accuracy, it will
be an attractive option for future epidemiological studies.
In an applied side of this thesis, we develop a framework for thinking about
the stability properties of banking networks due to overlapping portfolios. This
framework emphasizes that the key property is stability: If the system is stable,
shocks will not propagate; if it is unstable, a shock can be amplified and trigger
cascading bankruptcies. This can be discussed in terms of a branching process that
gives insight into the dynamics of failure. While we call these “banking networks”
for simplicity, the basic ideas are relevant for any leveraged financial institutions.
To understand how the stability of banking networks might depend on parameters
such as diversification, leverage and crowding, we formulate a stylized model of a
financial system in which N banks with average diversification µb invest in a common
pool of M assets. The system can be conveniently described in terms of a bipartite
network, with banks being connected through links to the assets in their portfolios.
Links have a two-fold role in such a network. On one hand, they allow individual
banks to diversify their investment and reduce their exposure to a specific asset. On
the other hand, they are channels for the propagation of financial contagion. We
characterize the response of such system to initial shocks a↵ecting a single asset or
bank.
The relevant parameters for the model are the average diversification µb , the
crowding parameter n = N/M (that measures the proportion of banks to assets),
and the initial leverage . By means of numerical simulations we show the existence
of phase transitions separating a region in parameter space where global cascades
occur from a region where global cascades never occur. In particular, the double
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role played by links in the bipartite network representing the system is reflected in
a non-monotonic behavior of the contagion probability as a function of µb , where
we observe the existence of two phase transitions at µb = µ1 and µb = µ2 that
define a window of connectivities such that global cascades occur if µ1 6 µb 6 µ2 .
Changing the crowding parameter n has the e↵ect of shifting the location of the
phase transitions. Finally, our model shows that increasing leverage increases the
overall instability of the system, but that there is a critical level of leverage below
which global cascades do not occur for any value of diversification or crowding.
Using an analytical approach based on generalized branching processes on networks, we are able to analytically estimate the region of parameter space where
global cascades occur. This branching process is di↵erent from standard ones in the
fact that the fate of a node depends on its degree and on the degree of all its neighbors. This greatly increases the difficulty of the problem. We are nonetheless able to
solve it by generalizing existing methods. Thus, apart from their specific application
to financial contagion, our methods can be applied to a wide variety of contagion
models, where susceptibility and transmission probabilities depend on node degrees.
The mechanistic model we consider in this chapter can be extended in several directions. First of all, it would be interesting to relax some of the specific assumptions
considered in this chapter (homogeneity of banks’ balance sheets, Poisson degree distributions, market impact function) in order to understand how di↵erent choices for
the network topology or the statistical properties of balance sheets impact the stability of the system. Although we do not expect di↵erent results from a qualitative
point of view, it should nonetheless be possible to asses the relative stability of systems with di↵erent properties, similarly to what has been done for counter-party loss
in [87]. In particular, it would be very useful to empirically characterize real systems
and calibrate the model with real data. This could potentially make it possible to
test the e↵ectiveness of new policies aimed at reducing systemic risk.
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A further direction we plan to pursue in the future is to go beyond the mechanistic
model by considering a more realistic price dynamics and allowing banks to react to
price fluctuations by rebalancing their portfolios. This should allow the system to
develop endogenous crisis similar to the ones observed in [104], and to generate the
systemic instabilities induced by leverage and mark-to-market accounting practices
discussed in [88].
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web of human sexual contacts. Nature 411, 907–908 (2001).
[35] M. Kuperman and G. Abramson, Small world e↵ect in an epidemiological model.
Phys. Rev. Lett. 86, 2909–2912 (2001).
[36] R. Pastor-Satorras and A. Vespignani, Epidemic spreading in scale-free networks. Phys. Rev. Lett. 86, 3200–3203 (2001).
[37] D. J. de S. Price, Networks of scientific papers. Science 149, 510–515 (1965).
[38] A. L. Lloyd and R. M. May, How viruses spread among computers and people.
Science 292, 1316–1317 (2001).
[39] D. Watts, A simple model of global cascades on random networks. PNAS 99-9,
57665771. (2001)
[40] S. Buldyrev, R. Parshani, G. Paul, H. Stanley, and S. Havlin, Catastrophic
cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature Physics 464, 10251028(2010).

85

References
[41] A. Banerjee, A. Chandrasekhar, E. Duflo, M. Jackson, The Di↵usion of Microfinance, Science 341-6144, 888-893(2013).
[42] B. Karrer and M.E.J. Newman, A message passing approach for general epidemic models, Phys. Rev. E 82, 016101 (2010)
[43] W. W. Zachary An information flow model for conflict and fission in small
groups, Journal of Anthropological Research 33 (4), 452-473 (1977)
[44] B. Pittel, J. Spencer, N. Wormald, Sudden Emergence of a Giant k-Core in a
Random Graph. Journal of Combinatorial Theory Series B 67-1,111-151(1991).
[45] J. Chalupa, Bootstrap percolation on a Bethe lattice. J. Phys. C 12, L3135(1979).
[46] R. Cerf and F. Manzo, Nucleation and growth for the Ising model in d dimensions at very low temperatures. Preprint. Available at arXiv:1102.1741.
[47] R. Cerf and F. Manzo, A d-dimensional nucleation and growth model. Preprint,
arXiv:1001.3990.
[48] J. M. Schwarz, A. J. Liu, and L. Q. Chayes, The onset of jamming as the sudden
emergence of an infinite k-core cluster, Europhys. Lett. 73, 560-566 (2006).
[49] M. Aizenman, and J. L. Lebowitz, Metastability e↵ects in bootstrap percolation.
J. Phys. A 21, 38013813. MR0968311 (1988)
[50] S. Janson, T. Luczak, T. Turova, and T. Vallier, Bootstrap percolation on the
random graph GN,P . The Annals of Applied Probability 22-5, 1989-2041 (2012)
[51] H. Amini, Bootstrap percolation and di↵usion in random graphs with given
vertex degrees, Electron. J. Combin. Research Paper 25, 20, 1077-8926 (2010)
[52] G. J. Baxter, S. N. Dorogovtsev, A. V. Goltsev, and J. F. F. Mendes, Bootstrap
Percolation on Complex Networks, arXiv:1003.5583 (2010)
[53] M.E.J. Newman, S.H. Strogatz, and D.J.Watts, Random graphs with arbitrary
degree distributions and their applications, Phys. Rev. E 64, 026118 (2001)
[54] A. Barabási, R. Albert, Emergence of scaling in random networks, Science 286
(5439) 509512 (1999).
[55] M. Granovetter, Threshold models of collective behavior. American Journal of
Sociology 83(6), 14201443(1978).

86

References
[56] M. Granovetter, The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology
78(6), 13601380(1973).
[57] J.H. Miller and S.E. Page, The standing ovation problem. Complexity 9, 8-16
(2004).
[58] M. A. Porter and J. P. Gleeson, Dynamical systems on networks: A tutorial.
arXiv:1403.7663 (2014).
[59] D. Lusseau, K. Schneider, O. J. Boisseau, P. Haase, E. Slooten, and S. M.
Dawson, The bottlenose dolphin community of Doubtful Sound features a large
proportion of long-lasting associations. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 54,
396-405 (2003).
[60] P. Zhang, and C. Moore, Scalable detection of statistically significant communities and hierarchies: message-passing for modularity. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 111 (51), 18144-18149
[61] K. Hashimoto, Zeta functions of finite graphs and representations of p-adic
groups. Advanced Studies in Pure Mathematics 15 211-280 (1989).
[62] J. Pearl, Reverend Bayes on inference engines: a distributed hierarchical approach. AAAI Proceedings 82, (1982).
[63] W. W. Zachary, An information flow model for conflict and fission in small
groups. Journal of Anthropological Research 33 (4), 452-473 (1977).
[64] M. J. Keeling and P. Rohani, Modeling Infectious Diseases in Humans and
Animals. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press (2008).
[65] F. Krzakala, C. Moore, E. Mossel, J. Neeman, A. Sly, L. Zdeborová, and P.
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